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Although the United States has maintained a one-China policy since 1972, U.S. 
actions have upheld de facto Taiwan sovereignty in the face of Chinese threats of forceful 
reunification.  This seemingly contradictory American stance has focused Chinese 
attention on the Taiwan issue and the U.S. role in perpetuating it.  The growing economic 
interdependence between Taiwan and the mainland make peaceful reunification a 
plausible exigency.  If China no longer needs to worry about this historical thorn in its 
paw, it is logical it would divert its attention and energies elsewhere.  This thesis 
examines the current state of economic, socio-political, and military considerations 
between the United States and the People’s Republic of China to infer the likelihood of 
either cooperation or contention between the two nations in a post-reunification era.  The 
thesis argues that endemic suspicion and competition between China and the United 
States make moot the possible amelioration in relations a PRC-ROC reunification might 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are two great 
powers with a history of considerable antagonism, occasionally moderated by shared 
interests.  On one hand, disagreements over issues as diverse as human rights and 
currency valuation have caused the two nations to squabble diplomatically, while the 
unresolved Taiwan issue has occasionally raised the specter of military action.  
Conversely, the two nations have at times shown a penchant for cooperation, as 
evidenced most recently by China’s collaboration in the six party North Korean nuclear 
talks and the flurry of cooperative activity immediately following the 9-11 terrorist 
attacks.  Given the existing economic, political, and military power of the United States 
and the burgeoning strength of China, it is important to address whether the two nations 
will pursue a cooperative or adversarial relationship in the future.  Such analysis begins 
with an understanding of the historical roots of the two nations’ relationship. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS – 
WORLD WAR II THROUGH THE COLD WAR 
1. Genesis of Mistrust 
In the early days of World War II, the United States recognized the importance of 
China as a regional anchor in a post-war environment.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
pictured a resurgent China rising to great power status, expecting it to become a 
stabilizing regional force in the post-war era.1  This ultimately resulted in China receiving 
a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council when the UN was founded in 
1945. 
Despite the optimistic plans envisioned for China, the ongoing civil war between 
the Kuomintang (KMT) and communist forces derailed what could have become a close 
Sino-American relationship.  Throughout World War II, the United States provided 
material and logistical support to Republic of China (ROC) forces fighting the Japanese.  
Additionally, the American government attempted, during and after the war, to 
ameliorate the schism between the KMT nationalists and the communists.  Nonetheless, 
 
1 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995, (New York:  Routledge, 
1996), 115. 
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China sank back into civil war following the failure of U.S. mediation in 1946.   As the 
tide of the conflict began to favor the communists, the United States shifted its plans for 
an Asian pole of influence away from China toward its wartime nemesis, Japan.2  
Receiving diminishing assistance from the United States, the KMT was defeated and 
ultimately sought refuge on the island of Formosa and the communists established the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949.   
Potential U.S.-PRC relations turned adversarial with Chinese support of North 
Korean communists and eventual participation in the Korean conflict.  On one side, 
American support of the KMT during the civil war angered the new Beijing government 
and provided one impetus for the United States being labeled the principal enemy of the 
new PRC.  On the other, the rising Cold War with the Soviet Union led the United States 
to view the new Mao-led government as part of a monolithic global communist network.  
President Harry S. Truman highlighted this point when he imposed an economic embargo 
on the PRC and ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait following the June 
1950 North Korean invasion of the south.3  In doing so, Truman hastily included Taiwan 
in the U.S. defense perimeter, increasing Chinese enmity towards America.  China 
entered into direct conflict with the Untied States after the late 1950 American 
counteroffensive on the Korean peninsula brought U.S. forces to the Yalu River. 
2. Ingraining an Adversarial Mindset 
For the nearly two decades following the Korean War, the United States and 
China warily viewed the other as a potential adversary.  For its part, China viewed the 
United States as a nation prone to international interference and bent on world hegemony.  
This concept may have had its genesis in American support of the KMT army during the 
Chinese civil war.4  Following the communist victory and until the late 1960s, the Mao-
led government formulated a world view that kept China locked in an ideological cycle 
that precluded cooperation with the West.  China believed that war with the United States 
 
2 Yahuda, Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 116. 
3 Ibid., 27. 
4 William R. Heaton, A United Front Against Hegemonism:  Chinese Foreign Policy into the 1980’s, 
National Security Affairs Monograph Series, no. 80-3 (Washington D.C.:  National Defense University 
Press, 1980), 3. 
3 
                                                
was indeed inevitable and may have played a role in its decision to support the Kim Il 
Sung government during the Korean War. 
At the same time, the United States held a similarly distrustful view of China 
during the 1950s and 1960s.  The advent of the Cold War led the United States to group 
all communist adversaries together into a single united opponent, discounting the nuances 
of the occasionally strained relations between communist states.  The Chinese 
participation in the Korean War exacerbated this view as the United States perceived a 
nefarious cabal working together to advance communism in Northeast Asia.  Ironically, 
the Sino-Soviet split did little to ameliorate these feelings.  The United States continued 
to view China as a dangerous potential adversary, even as its own relations with the 
Soviet Union were moderating.5  Military posturing over Taiwan during the 1950s and 
the American perception that Chinese were aiding Hanoi in the Vietnam War contributed 
to this poisoned view of the Chinese. 
The results of this mutual distrust were perhaps most problematic for the Chinese 
as it hindered their national economic and defense progress, especially after the Sino-
Soviet split.  Effectively cut off from the developed world, China operated in a virtual 
technological vacuum.  This dearth of outside assistance, coupled with the crippling 
effects of Mao-inspired national programs, prevented China from becoming a significant 
power in Asia.  Furthermore, China’s antipathy towards building truly constructive 
relationships with the global community during the “lost decades” of the 1950s and 
1960s inhibited its international political maturation.  For the United States, the effects of 
this distrust were not as obvious, but significant nonetheless.  Although the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations attempted to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union 
during the 1960s, they persisted in the “monolithic communism” world view outlined in 
NSC-68.6  This drove the United States to treat the burgeoning Vietnam issue as a zero 
sum game, rather than explore possible alternative courses of action.  A more deliberate 
examination of the situation may have led the United States to more effectively play 
China off against the Soviet Union in hopes of decreasing support for the North 
Vietnamese.  Furthermore, American fears of direct Chinese intervention in Vietnam 
 
5 Yahuda, Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 124. 
6 Ibid., 126. 
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limited American willingness to apply maximum force to the North Vietnamese.  Thus, 
American distrust and fear of the Chinese prevented actions that could have at least 
mitigated the catastrophe that Vietnam became for American foreign policy. 
3. Sundering Chinese Isolation 
While Sino-American relations foundered for nearly two decades, several events 
converged in the late 1960s that eventually ended Chinese isolation.  First, the worsening 
Sino-Soviet relationship and failed attempts at strategic Third World alignments forced 
the Chinese to signal their interest in dialogue with Washington in 1968.7  Interestingly, 
American attitudes towards China had also moderated as the fact that China was no 
longer a Soviet puppet regime began to shape Washington’s approach to Beijing.8  
Furthermore, American diplomats began to call into question the wisdom behind isolating 
an established nuclear power.  The Sino-American rapprochement began in secret, but 
abruptly came into view when Secretary of State Kissinger made a surprise visit to 
Beijing in July 1971.9
This moderation of attitudes brought numerous benefits to the Chinese in the 
years to come.  Assuaging an immediate security threat, the Chinese obtained assurances 
from Washington not to conspire with the Soviet Union against China.  A more 
meaningful long term result involved Beijing’s supplanting the ROC (Taiwan) at the 
United Nations, including taking over the permanent seat at the Security Council.  This 
diplomatic coup resulted in a double win for the PRC as the United States failed in its 
dual membership proposal for the two Chinas.10  In effect, this failure acknowledged the 
legitimacy of the PRC and provided a measure of international recognition of its claim to 
Taiwan.  The opening to China also signaled the emergence of the PRC into the 
community of nations.  Previously, China had been viewed as an unpredictable, 
menacing force in Asia.  Its new status as a United Nations member and warming 
relations with the United States opened diplomatic doors for China that had previously 
been closed.  The Sino-American rapprochement may thus be seen as the beginning of 
 
7 Yahuda, Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 201. 
8 Ibid., 127. 
9 Ibid., 77. 
10 Ibid., 202. 
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the symbolic Chinese “awakening” and put them squarely on the road towards great 
power status. 
The period of tripolarity – a term implying the effect China had on the bipolar 
nature of world affairs – persisted until the early 1980s.  The election of Ronald Reagan 
and the incipient anti-communist foreign policy shift rankled the Chinese.  However, the 
relative decline of the Soviet Union had already caused the Chinese to drift away from 
their relationship with the United States.11  In the waning years of the 1970s and 
throughout the 1980s, China embarked on an ambitious program of economic reform and 
military modernization.  Spearheaded by reformer Deng Xiaoping, these changes 
transformed the backwards Chinese economy and provided yet another sign that the 
Chinese giant was awakening.  Following U.S. recognition of the PRC in 1979, Chinese 
trade with the West, particularly the United States, boomed throughout the 1980s despite 
lingering American distrust.  However, the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 brought 
economic sanctions and undesired international political scrutiny for the Chinese.  This 
singular event, so close to the end of the Cold War, would reverberate throughout the 
post-Cold War period and provide ongoing doubts throughout the world regarding the 
Chinese. 
B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TAIWAN FOR SINO-AMERICAN 
RELATIONS 
Arguably, Taiwan’s sovereignty presents the most persistent irritant in the Sino-
American relationship.  Formerly a Japanese colony, Taiwan provided refuge for Chiang 
Kai-shek’s retreating Nationalist forces following the 1949 communist victory.  The 
World War II peace treaty signed with Japan in September 1951 failed to address Chinese 
claims to this island, beginning an ongoing period of ambiguity regarding Taiwan’s 
status.12  On one hand, the United States actively defended Taiwan when threatened by 
China, notably in 1954-1955 and 1958 after Chinese shelling of offshore islands held by 
the PRC.  However, U.S. support appeared to wane vis-à-vis Taiwan during the early 
1970s rapprochement with China when the United States agreed to adopt a “One China” 
 
11 Yahuda, Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 207. 
12 John J. Tkacik, America’s “China Policy” is in Urgent Need of Definition [testimony on-line] 
(Washington D.C.:  The Heritage Foundation, April 19, 2005, accessed 20 October 2005); available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/hl874.cfm; Internet. 
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policy.13  Nonetheless, the United States continued to provide moral and material support 
to Taiwan in the form of ongoing military assistance.  Throughout the remainder of the 
Cold War years and into the post-Cold War era, the United States and China have 
maintained a pretense of agreeing to differ regarding the Taiwan issue.  While the United 
States officially espouses an ambiguous “One China” policy, the Chinese advertise their 
desire for peaceful reunification with the island.14  Such statements belie the desire each 
side has to see the Taiwan issue progress to its satisfaction. 
The Chinese consider resolution of the Taiwan issue a top national priority and 
another step towards their ascendancy as a leading power in Asia and around the world.  
Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing underscored the depth of PRC commitment to 
reunification in July 2004 when he said “even if all problems in China were added up, the 
sum total would still not be heavier than the Taiwan issue.”15  China chafes at American 
military sales to the island and loudly objects when Taipei participates in international 
forums normally reserved for sovereign nations.16  Although Chinese military officials 
are generally reluctant to discuss the Taiwan issue, it is believed that China’s dramatic 
military buildup serves its desire to use coercive diplomacy to return Taiwan to mainland 
control.17  The March 2005 passage of the anti-secession law by the Chinese National 
People’s Congress codifies the desire of Beijing to bring Taiwan back to the motherland 
and provides a legal foundation for possible military action against the island.18  Despite 
the bellicose rhetoric coming from Beijing regarding use of force versus Taiwan, warfare 
would appear to be a last resort for the PRC.  The likely global condemnation of military 
action coupled with the probable decimation of Taiwan would serve to make all out 
warfare against Taiwan a fool’s errand.19  Nonetheless, the Chinese believe a credible 
 
13 Tkacik, America’s “China Policy” [testimony on-line]; Internet. 
14 Ibid., Internet. 
15 Bonnie S. Glaser, “U.S.-China Relations:  Rice Visits Beijing, but Disappoints Her Hosts,” ed. Brad 
Glosserman and Vivian Brailey Fritschi, Comparative Connections 6, no. 3, (October 2004):  38 [journal 
on-line]; available from http://8.7.97.201/media/csis/pubs/0403q.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 October 2005.   
16 Ibid., 38. 
17 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, (Berkeley:  University of California Press), 308, 
318-319. 
18 Kerry Dumbaugh, “China-U.S. Relations:  Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy,” 
Washington D.C.:  Congressional Research Service, September 29, 2005, 5. 
19 Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, 318. 
7 
                                                
military threat is necessary to simultaneously deter a Taiwanese declaration of 
independence and influence reconciliation on the mainland’s terms.  
While China considers Taiwan a renegade province that must be returned, the 
United States strongly supports maintenance of the status quo.  The American 
government formally committed to protect Taiwanese territory through the December 
1954 Mutual Defense Treaty.  The United States appeared to abandon Taiwan through 
the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué that affirmed a “One China” policy and later voided the 
Mutual Defense Treaty in favor of normalized relations with Beijing in 1979.  In 
retrospect, the United States appears to have maintained a commitment to the status quo 
through passage of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979.  While acknowledging the 
cessation of formal relations between America and Taiwan, the act places responsibility 
on the U.S. government to take steps to ensure Taiwan is free to determine its future 
without threat or compelling action from the mainland.20  In the intervening years since 
passage of this act, the United States has provided additional affirmations (the 1982 “Six 
Assurances”) and ongoing military arms sales and logistical support to Taiwan.  
Nonetheless, the United States is not interested in seeing an independent Taiwan, either.  
While the current administration is widely viewed as the most accommodating 
presidency since initiation of the Taiwan Relations Act, President Bush issued a stern 
warning to independence-minded leaders in December 2003:  “The comments and 
actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate he may be willing to make decisions 
unilaterally that change the status quo, which we oppose.”21  The rationale for this 
seemingly Janus-faced policy is two-fold.  On one hand, America wishes to prevent 
Taipei from provoking Beijing to resort to force.  On the other hand, the United States 
desires to deliberately moderate Chinese behavior and coax the PRC to accept 
institutional norms within the community of nations.  This fact is illustrated in the 
following statement by former Secretary of State Colin Powell explaining the meaning of 
Taiwan arms sales in the face of a One China policy:  “It has allowed China, instead of 
concerning itself about whether there’s going to be a conflict with Taiwan, but for China 
 
20 Taiwan Relations Act, U.S. Code, 96-8, (1979), [document on-line]; available from 
http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/Taiwan_Relations_Act.html; Internet. 
21 Dumbaugh, “China-U.S. Relations,” 7. 
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to develop itself and to join the international community, economically and politically.”22  
Despite these ostensibly pious intentions, it is also likely that Asia-Pacific balance of 
power considerations are also at play regarding American support of the status quo.23  
Taiwan provides a symbolic example of American political strength in East Asia; its 
reversion to China would provide a tangible signal to the world of China’s ascendancy at 
the cost of American political prestige.  If Washington is purposefully pursuing an 
ambiguous position vis-à-vis Taiwan to shape Chinese behavior, it would be logical for 
such a position to become untenable if China met international normative standards.  
Additionally, the United States would be viewed as hypocritical if it attempted to stymie 
a mutual decision by China and Taiwan to reunify peacefully.  Therefore, the United 
States finds itself in a quandary:  its own One China policy, designed to placate Beijing 
could ultimately upset the status quo America seeks to preserve.  This begs the question 
of how likely is a peaceful PRC-Taiwan merger.      
C. THE POSSIBILITY OF A PEACEFUL MERGER 
The Chinese appear to be pursuing a carrot and stick strategy of military coercion 
and economic conciliation towards Taiwan.  Thus far, the combination of PRC military 
strength and diplomatic efforts has successfully deterred a Taiwanese declaration of 
independence.  The cross-Strait military buildup may be viewed less for its potential use 
for forceful reunification and more for its capacity to intimidate and guide the Taiwanese 
toward the desired PRC objective.  While Beijing utilizes this military “stick,” it also 
employs economic incentives to draw Taiwan closer to the ultimate objective of 
assimilation.  The effectiveness of this strategy may not be immediately apparent, but it 
presents a plausible case for a peaceful merger between Taiwan and the PRC. 
An initial examination of Taiwanese politics would appear to negate any thought 
of reconciliation with the mainland.  The KMT government, originally established as the 
government of all of China, ruled unilaterally over Taiwan until legalization of 
opposition parties in 1987.  Led by leaders who had lost the Chinese Civil War, the KMT 
 
22 Colin Powell, interview by Anthony Yuen, Phoenix TV, 25 October 2004 [transcript on-line]; 
available from http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2004/Oct/26-277540.html; Internet; accessed 20 October 
2005.  
23 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?,” 
Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 (Summer 2002):  21-22. 
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largely eschewed PRC calls for reunification and sought Western assistance to prevent 
communist moves against the island.  As Taiwan moved towards a pluralistic political 
system, some factions such as the New Party and the People First Party expressed greater 
interest in reconciliation with the mainland, ultimately desiring reunification.  However, 
the tenor of Taiwanese politics swung towards formal independence with the gains made 
by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the late 1990s, culminating in the election 
of DPP candidate Chen Sui-bian to the presidency in 2000.  Although the DPP has 
moderated its independence rhetoric, largely due to American pressure, a significant 
segment of the population supports the concept of outright independence.24  This fact is 
perhaps rooted in the development of a unique Taiwanese identity distinct and separate 
from the mainland.25  Despite the current direction of Taiwanese politics, business forces 
may alter the course of future events between the island and the PRC. 
The accelerating economic ties between Taiwan and the PRC present a significant 
opportunity for the mainland to influence the direction of Sino-Taiwanese relations.  
Over three-quarters of Taiwan’s companies are invested in mainland ventures, totaling 
upwards of $60 billion.26  This considerable investment represents over ten percent of 
Taiwan’s gross domestic product and has helped the PRC supplant America as Taiwan’s 
largest export market.27  Furthermore, Beijing is attempting to utilize the extensive cross-
Strait business ties to facilitate potential political initiatives, such as inclusion of Taiwan 
in the Chinese Free Trade Area.28  Beijing may also welcome the increasing relocation of 
Taiwanese businessmen to mainland domiciles as a way to re-indoctrinate segments of 
the island’s society toward a viewpoint that may later aid reunification efforts.29  Thus, 
Beijing views economic integration across the Strait as a vehicle to eventual 
 
24 United States Central Intelligence Agency, “Taiwan,” 4 October 2005 [fact sheet on-line]; available 
at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tw.html; Internet; accessed  20 October 2005. 
25 Annie Chen, “Identity Crisis:  When does identity stop and nationality begin?,” The Columbia 
Political Review 2, no. 2 (December 2002) [journal on-line]; available from 
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/cpu/cpr/issues/2/2/index.html; Internet; accessed 20 October 2005. 
26 Tucker, “If Taiwan Chooses Unification,” 16. 
27 United States Central Intelligence Agency, “Taiwan,” [fact sheet on-line]; Internet.. 
28 China is attempting to create a regional free trade area including the PRC, Hong Kong and Macao.  
The mainland would like to include Taiwan in this arrangement to entice additional business commitments 
and incorporate Taiwan in an economic Sino-centric regime.  See Tucker, “If Taiwan Chooses 
Unification,” 17. 
29 Tucker, “If Taiwan Chooses Unification,” 16. 
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reunification.  One hubristic PRC official underscored this attitude in early 2002 when he 
proclaimed “Our economy is our best weapon.  We won’t attack them (Taiwan).  We will 
buy them.  It’s very Chinese.”30     
The dichotomy between politics and economics presents a potential fissure in the 
status quo of Sino-Taiwanese relations.  Some believe Taiwan’s economic integration 
with the mainland presents an irresistible force that will invariably shape future political 
decisions and alter the current state of affairs.  Chu Yun-han of Academia Sinica 
illustrated this point when she said: 
None of Taiwan's political parties are fully prepared to deal with the social 
and political implications of the island's increasing economic dependence 
on the mainland.  Further economic integration is likely to undermine the 
social foundations of Taipei's preferences on security policy.31 
Signs of this shift in policy may already be evident as recently proposed U.S. arms sales 
to Taiwan have been cut by Taiwanese lawmakers in an effort to attract broad legislative 
support.32  Furthermore, polls show that Taiwan’s populace is increasingly mesmerized 
with business opportunities on the mainland and seeks to avoid conflict with its economic 
benefactor.33  While the topical view of Taiwan’s politics may indicate a predilection 
towards independence, a strong economic undercurrent exists that could redefine 
Taiwanese politics in the future.  This could partly explain why the KMT has regained its 
political footing through its increasingly conciliatory message vis-à-vis the PRC.  One 
concludes that a Sino-Taiwanese peaceful merger is indeed plausible. 
D. THE QUESTION OF FUTURE SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 
The likelihood of indefinite perpetuation of the cross-Strait status quo is 
questionable.  The possibility exists for Taiwan and China to arrive at a peaceful 
resolution that results in PRC control of the island.  Given the importance the PRC and 
the United States each ascribe to the Taiwan issue and its apparent position as an 
 
30 John Pomfret, “China Sees Interests Tied to U.S.,” Washington Post, 2 February 2002, A1. 
31 The Hoover Institution, “Hoover Institution Hosts Conference on China’s Leadership,” Hoover 
Institution Newsletter, 3 February 2003 [newsletter on-line]; available from http://www-
hoover.stanford.edu/pubaffairs/newsletter/03021/default.htm; Internet; accessed 21 October 2005. 
32 Dumbaugh, “China-U.S. Relations,” 7. 
33 Willy Lam, “China woos Taiwan non-separatists,” CNN On-line, 2 May 2005; available from 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/04/25/eyeonchina.taiwan/index.html; Internet; accessed 21 
October 2005. 
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impediment towards a more cooperative association between these two great powers, one 
must ask what the Sino-American relationship would be if Taiwan were no longer an 
issue.  If Taiwan peacefully reunified with the PRC, would that ameliorate the 
occasionally tenuous Sino-American relationship, or would it embolden a rising power 
(China) at the expense of a hegemonic power (the United States)?  Would peaceful 
resolution of the Taiwan issue allow greater regional cooperation between the PRC and 
nations aligned with the United States, or would it serve as a first “domino” in a shift 
towards a new Sino-centric regional order?  Would elimination of the Taiwan question 
ease fears of the ongoing Chinese military build up, or would it provide justification to 
the Chinese that merely the threat of military means can be effectively employed to 
garner a political end? 
Divining the answer to these questions requires an assessment of current trends in 
the Sino-American relationship, while accounting for the hypothetical condition of a 
peaceful Sino-Taiwanese merger.  Consideration of contemporary economic, socio-
political, and military issues between the United States and China may help clarify 
whether these two nations would likely move towards cooperation or contention in a 
post-reunification era.  Arriving at conclusions to these questions may then aid decision 
makers in formulating future policy objectives vis-à-vis a post-reunification China. 
Resolution of the Taiwan question would serve to mitigate regional fears of a 
military showdown between the United States and the PRC.  Coupled with the 
improvement in bilateral Sino-American affairs since creation of the PRC, this event 
would appear to support development of a closer, more constructive relationship between 
the United States and a unified China.  However, considerable tensions remain between 
the two nations beyond the Taiwan issue, indicating factors that could negatively affect 
the post-reunification relationship.  The nature of these factors suggests an endemic level 
of suspicion and antagonism between the United States and the PRC, hindering 

































                                                
II. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY  
An examination of international relations (IR) theory may help in discerning the 
nuances of the current Sino-American relationship and may aid in the formulation of 
correct policy in a post-reunification environment.  Using IR theory, one may compare 
the motives and justifications of the participating states, view alternate sides of a 
particular issue, and help forecast trends.  Though not guaranteed certainty, IR theory 
provides a basis for predicting the course of events between states.  The three major 
theoretical schools of thought (neo-realism, liberalism, and constructivism) supply the 
background for analysis of the various aspects of the Sino-American relationship.          
A. NEO-REALISM 
Anarchy, self-interest and preservation, and security dilemmas are features 
marking the theory of international politics known as neo-realism.  Unlike a domestic 
political system that exhibits hierarchical structure with centralized control, the 
international system is anarchic, according to those who subscribe to realist tenets.34  
This anarchic system conveys an inherent threat of violence, given the lack of a 
supranational agent to control conflicting parties.35  Facing this bleak situation, states 
attempt to assuage their security concerns by either developing their military and 
economic capabilities, or by collaboration with other stronger states.  Paradoxically, this 
collaboration may also lead to distrust and fear of dependence, leading to state 
insecurity.36  Realists acknowledge the existence of supranational actors, but their power 
is deemed inferior to that of major states and thus unable to alter the anarchic 
environment.37   Furthermore, these transcendent entities are often manipulated by these 
same major states for their own self interest.  Thus, a state has no choice but to rely upon 
itself and act in such a way that consistently benefits its own concerns and secures greater 
amounts of national power if it is to survive in this Darwinian environment. 
 
34 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading MA:  Addison-Wesley, 1979), 88. 
35 Ibid., 103. 
36 Ibid., 105-106. 
37 Ibid., 95. 
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A neo-realist view of the Sino-American relationship would hold that each nation 
is competing with the other to secure the largest share of power and influence, 
maximizing its relative gain.  In other words, each is seeking to maximize its absolute 
gains, regardless of the expense to the other.  As the established power, the United States 
would prefer to maintain the current world situation, preserving its hegemony.  On the 
other hand, the revisionist power (China) would desire a redefinition of the world order to 
raise its position.38  A neo-realist would attribute each nation’s participation in 
supranational organizations as a vehicle towards greater power, perhaps through its 
constraint of the other player’s power.  Similarly, relationships with other nations will be 
forged in an effort to counterbalance the other’s power.  What cooperation does exist 
between these two nations may be attributed to individual respective efforts to maximize 
individual benefits, regardless of costs or gains the other may realize.  Essentially, a neo-
realist would view the economic, political, and military aspects of the Sino-American 
relationship as pragmatic, prone to self interest, and likely to show signs of conflict. 
B. LIBERALISM 
While neo-realists have a foreboding picture of international relations, liberals 
tend to have a somewhat more optimistic view of international relations.  Like neo-
realists, liberals accept the premise of states operating in an anarchic environment, raising 
the potential for inter-state rivalry.  However, liberals contend that cooperative 
relationships between states are possible given a willingness of actors to adjust their 
behavior to the preferences of others.39  The key concern among liberals is providing an 
environment whereby actors willingly choose to forego self interest in favor of 
cooperation, even in situations where considerable conflict of interest exists.  
Transnational institutions and international regimes are viewed as beneficial in achieving 
this liberal objective.  Institutions are created to alter the payoff structure a state perceives 
by increasing the costs or decreasing the benefits of defection (non-cooperation), while 
increasing the benefits and decreasing the costs of cooperation, effectively altering the 
 
38 Rita Kernacs, “The Future of U.S. Relations with Japan and China:  Will Bilateral Relations Survive 
the New American Unilateralism?, “ Asia Pacific:  Perspectives 4, no. 1 (14 August 2004):  1. 
39 Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Undar Anarchy:  Strategies and 
Institutions, World Politics 38, no. 1 (October 1985):  226. 
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international environment by creating mutuality of interest.40  Additionally, institutions 
are helpful in creating the effect known as “shadow of the future.”  When nations weigh 
the consequences or benefits of their current actions against potential future 
considerations, they are more likely to cooperate.41  Finally, institutions are helpful in 
building effective reciprocity between states by aiding in defector identification and 
punishment, especially among a large collective.42  Thus, creation of international 
agencies and regimes may help not only to mitigate the self interest pressure a state may 
feel in an international arena, but may facilitate interstate cooperation. 
The Sino-American relationship would probably not be viewed as ominously by a 
liberal than by a neo-realist.  First, a liberal would point to each nation’s participation in 
such international organizations as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) as indicative of the value of institutions in overcoming naked national self-
interest.  For example, Sino-American collaboration on United Nations Security Council 
resolution 1566 affirms the power of such a multi-national organization to create 
mutuality of interest, increase the shadow of the future, and improve international 
reciprocity.43  Secondly, growing interdependence between the two nations would not 
only validate the liberal viewpoint regarding the value of international regimes, but 
suggests a convergence of their individual objectives and an interest in improving future 
outcomes.  While occasional friction may continue between the two nations on economic, 
political, and military matters, these tensions may be assuaged through the network of 
international regimes in which each nation participates. 
C. CONSTRUCTIVISM 
While neo-realists and liberals contend that the anarchic structure frames the 
international environment and forces nations to compete, constructivists reject the 
rationalist idea that states are doomed to competitive power politics and focus on the 
 
40 Axelrod and Keohane, Achieving Cooperation, 228. 
41 Ibid., 232. 
42 Ibid., 234-238. 
43 The United States and China collaborated with other members of the UN Security Council to call on 
all countries to prosecute and extradite those people or groups supporting terrorist acts.  See UN News 
Centre, “New Security Council Resolution Directs Aim at All Terrorists,” UN News Centre, 8 October 
2004; available from http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=12168&Cr=terror&Cr1=; Internet; 
accessed 24 October 2005. 
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relational interaction between states.  Constructivists argue that state identity and interests 
are shaped within the international system, rather than existing as exogenous variables.44  
Social constructivist theories hold that individuals (and logically, groups of people) act 
relative to the meaning other people have for them.45  While distribution of power may 
still affect how a state acts, it will only matter insofar as the state’s own ideas shape its 
assessments and reactions to that power.46  Thus, if Nation A chooses to perceive Nation 
B as a threatening enemy, Nation A will act as an enemy toward Nation B.  While it is 
possible to socially construct a Hobbesian self-help system, it is also possible to escape 
such a system through institutions that facilitate new understandings of self and others.47  
Through these new perceptions, the national behavior may then be changed. 
A constructivist would likely view potential areas for improvement in the Sino-
American relationship, but would also ascribe the considerable progress the two nations 
have achieved as indicative of the power of social construction.  One could point to the 
souring of PRC-American relations after 1949 as an example of deleterious social 
construction.  The perception each nation cultivated regarding the other drove each to 
treat the other as a threat, further reinforcing the negative social construction.  
Conversely, the decision by each nation to rethink the adversarial position it assigned to 
the other helped foster the early 1970s Sino-American rapprochement.  Like a liberal, a 
constructivist may find benefit in multi-national regimes that bring the two nations 
together.  Positive social construction would be realized when, through these regimes, the 
United States and the PRC achieve a new understanding of the other’s position and 
concerns. 
D. WHITHER CHINA? 
The question of which IR school of thought best describes present and future 
Chinese actions may help define future policy objectives vis-à-vis the PRC.  Samuel S. 
Kim, adjunct professor of political science and senior research scholar at the East Asian 
Institute, Columbia University, asserts that China practices a realpolitik foreign policy to 
 
44 Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It:  The Social Construction of Power Politics, 
International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992):  394-395, 402. 
45 Ibid., 397. 
46 Ibid., 397. 
47 Ibid., 417. 
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compensate for a regime with weak legitimacy that has thus far been unable to return 
China to historical preeminence.48  According to Kim, all Chinese believe in China’s 
inalienable right to great power status, leading to dissatisfaction with the global status 
quo.49  China challenges the existing unipolar situation and responds to the constricting 
pressures of globalization by practicing a form of “exemptionalism.”50  This Chinese 
exemptionalism leads to a Chinese desire for dispensation from certain expectations, 
particularly human rights requirements, inherent in a global environment.51  This view of 
China suggests it will seek greater power and influence at the expense of other nations.  
Furthermore, China’s exemptionalism indicates a disdain for international institutions 
that constrain Chinese behavior.  
While Professor Kim acknowledges China’s neo-realist proclivities, he also 
believes its participation in regimes will moderate its approach to the global community, 
particularly the United States.  Kim asserts that strict bilateral engagement with China 
perpetuates realpolitik and that a policy of multilateral integration will serve to draw 
China into the global community.52  Following this liberal approach, one would conclude 
that China’s ongoing participation in regimes such the United Nations and recent 
accession to the WTO should have altered its actions and will continue to pay dividends 
in the future.   
Zhongying Pang, professor of international studies at Nankai University, contends 
China’s ascendance is gradually bringing about positive social construction within the 
nation.53  Pang believes that the continuing socialization of China within the global 
community will result in a shift in national behavior from one focused on China’s 
 
48 Samuel S. Kim, “China as a Great Power,” Current History, 96 (September 1997) [archived journal 
article online]; available from http://www.currenthistory.com/archivesep97/Kim.html; Internet; accessed 10 
December 2005. 
49 Ibid., Internet. 
50 Ibid., Internet. 
51 Ibid., Internet. 
52 Ibid., Internet. 
53 Zhongying Pang, “China as a Normal State?  Understanding China’s Unfinished Transformation 
from a State Socialisation Perspective,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs 18, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2004):  
341 
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interests (power) and values (culture) to one of shared international norms.54  This would 
appear to indicate that China just needs more time to acclimate to the expectations of the 
international system.  Pang notes that China’s late entrance into the Westphalia nation 
system and its self imposed isolation during the Mao years are principally responsible for 
China’s weak socialization with the international community.55  Similar to a liberal view, 
this constructivist view would indicate China’s perceptions and reactions to the global 
community should be moderating following its ongoing participation in multilateral 
regimes. 
 
54 Zhongying Pang, “China as a Normal State?,” 343-344. 
55 Ibid., 346. 
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III. SINO-AMERICAN ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The 1978 decision by the Chinese Communist Party to overhaul its centrally 
planned economy in favor of a market-oriented system marked a momentous point in the 
evolution of modern China.  Previously, the command economy displayed the same 
xenophobic tendencies as the rest of the Communist controlled state apparatus.  Under 
Mao Zedong inspired policy, the Chinese economy sought self sufficiency, seeking trade 
with outside nations only insofar as to provide what could not be produced or extracted 
domestically.  Since initiating economic reforms in 1979, China has moved away from 
central planning toward a market economy with considerable economic policy 
decentralization56.  During this time, China actively sought out foreign investment and 
technology to help build an export-oriented economy.  The results thus far have been 
impressive for the Chinese.  China is currently one of the fastest growing economies in 
the world, with an annualized GDP growth of 9.3 percent since 1979.57  Furthermore, 
Chinese export surpluses have helped fuel this rapid growth.  As of 2003, China’s annual 
trade surplus with the United States, Japan, and the European Union totaled over $205 
billion combined.58   
As an ascending, export-oriented economic power, the PRC is reliant on foreign 
capital and access to overseas markets to fuel its growth.  The gradual integration of 
China into the world economy over the past three decades has helped further its economic 
expansion and presented it with opportunities previously unexplored.  In the process, this 
integration has resulted in both increased economic cooperation between China and the 
rest of the world, as well as new areas of friction unseen during the days of central 
economic planning.  Whether the Taiwan question is resolved peacefully or maintains its 
status quo, these economic issues are likely to persist.  Additionally, these issues may 
provide insight into the tenor of the Sino-American relationship. 
 
56 Wayne M. Morrison, “China’s Economic Conditions,” Washington D.C.:  Congressional Research 
Service, July 25, 2005, 1. 
57 Ibid, 2. 
58 Thomas Lum and Dick K. Nanto, “China’s Trade with the United States and the World,” 
Washington D.C.:  Congressional Research Service, April 29, 2005, 14. 
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The United States faces several economic considerations with China, some that 
alternatively could be viewed as contentious or ameliorating.  Chief among these 
concerns is the burgeoning U.S. trade deficit with China and its effect on the American 
job market.  Closely tied to current account balance concerns are questions about China’s 
currency peg and its seemingly unfair trade policies, particularly in light of its accession 
to the WTO.  The mid-2005 attempt by the Chinese oil company CNOOC to acquire the 
American oil company Unocal underscored the growing competition for natural resources 
and interjected uncertainty regarding Chinese ownership of “strategically” important U.S. 
corporations.  The increasingly close trade relationship between China and nations in 
Southeast Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere raises questions about the political 
ramifications of China’s economic ascendance.  Finally, the potential of a peaceful 
resolution to the Taiwan issue could accelerate movement towards a potential pan-East 
Asian economic zone with China as its pivot.   
B. THE INTERTWINING OF ECONOMIES:  THE TRADE DEFICIT, THE 
CURRENCY PEG, AND THE WTO 
The dramatic increase in Chinese produced consumer goods is apparent whenever 
one visits a local Wal-Mart.  Less apparent are the underlying ramifications of this influx 
of Chinese wares.  The United States began running a trade deficit with China in 1983.59  
The connotation associated with this annually growing figure has become increasingly 
negative in recent years, largely due to the attendant loss of American jobs in various 
industries relocated to China.  However, there are indications the United States has 
reaped a considerable windfall nonetheless from the flood of Chinese goods and from the 
outsourcing that made this torrent possible.  Furthermore, one must ask whether the 
current pattern of trade indicates a convergence of Sino-American interests and whether 
such a pattern is sustainable. 
The principle of comparative advantage states that a nation will gain from trade 
when it exports goods or services in which it has the greatest relative prepotency and 
imports those in which it has the least relative advantage.60  This leads to an ideal 
allocation of resources to maximize productive efficiency.  China’s relative advantage 
 
59 Lum and Nanto, “China’s Trade with the United States and the World,” 12. 
60 Thomas A. Pugel and Peter H. Lindert, International Economics, 11th ed., (Boston:  Irwin McGraw-
Hill, 2000), 38.   
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lies in labor intensive industries requiring semi-skilled workers, while its disadvantage is 
in resource, capital, and technology dependent industries.61  According to the Heckscher-
Ohlin theory of factor proportions, China will naturally export products that utilize its 
abundant production factors intensively and import those utilizing its scarce factors.62  
Due to these economic realities, free trade between China and the United States will have 
the long term effect of equalizing prices, allowing efficient specialization, and providing 
a net gain for each country.63
Labor intensive industries in China have an advantage over those in other parts of 
the world.  However, the current trade deficit masks the fact that a significant portion of 
imports from Chinese shores come from foreign owned companies.  China is an attractive 
alternative locale for worldwide manufacturers in a variety of industries ranging from 
textiles to auto parts manufacturing.  Nonetheless, relocating manufacturing overseas is 
not ventured upon lightly.  Conventional wisdom holds that businesses will only relocate 
if they can realize savings of at least ten to twenty percent after the move.64  Considering 
the thirty-fold jump in annual foreign direct investment (FDI) in China and the 
corresponding 56,267 percent increase in exports by these foreign invested enterprises 
since 1986,65 it is apparent industries around the world have realized considerable gains 
from their Chinese investments. 
The windfall gained through low-cost Chinese manufacturing tends to be passed 
on to consumers, producing downward pricing pressure throughout an economy.66  In a 
consumer-oriented economy, such as that of the United States, the effect of this 
downward pressure helps control prices, even when raw material prices rise, and helps 
those who consume more realize larger savings, further energizing the nation’s 
 
61 Leonard K. Cheng, “China’s Economic Benefits from Its WTO Membership,” Center for Economic 
Development, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, December 1999; available from 
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63 Ibid., 62-63. 
64 Ted C. Fishman, China Inc., (New York:  Scribner, 2005), 253. 
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economy.67  For comparison, the 2003 tax cut initiated by President George W. Bush 
provided a $500 per-family stimulus to the American economy, roughly comparable to 
the per-family savings realized due to the effect of Chinese exports.68  One could 
conclude from these facts that foreign investment in China has paid considerable 
economic dividends to the United States and other nations engaged in trade with the 
Chinese. 
Aside from the economic benefits realized through importation of inexpensive 
Chinese made goods, there are indications liberalized trade with China is paying other 
dividends.  Western powers have long eyed the vast Chinese population for its untapped 
potential as a consumer base.  The National Association of Manufacturers underscored 
this view by endorsing China’s membership in the WTO and strongly lobbying the U.S. 
Congress for approval of Chinese accession.69  The burgeoning trade imbalance masks 
the fact that increased trade with China has resulted in a dramatic increase in U.S. exports 
to the PRC.  Since 2000, U.S. exports to China have increased 112 percent, growing from 
2.1 to 4.2 percent of aggregate U.S. exports during the five year period.70  Consistent 
with the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, American exports of high technology equipment and 
value added materials experienced double digit growth in 2003.71   As China’s economy 
continues to grow and mature, U.S. exports are expected to continue this rapid pattern of 
growth,72 suggesting a potential moderation of the trade deficit with China in the future. 
The other side of the Chinese trade equation is the deleterious effect it has on 
certain industrial sectors competing with Chinese goods.  Whereas Chinese imports are a 
boon to American consumers, they are perceived to come at the expense of American 
production jobs.  The American textile industry has been particularly hard hit by the 
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influx of Chinese made clothing, leading to threats of American protectionism for the 
foundering textile sector.73  Additionally, there are concerns the threat from Chinese 
imports may be expanding.  For example, imports of Chinese made computer equipment 
grew 255 percent from 2000 to 2004,74 portending a growing technical competence 
within Chinese manufacturing and perhaps threatening more skilled American 
professions in the future.  This fact is particularly foreboding when one considers the 
commitment Beijing has placed on creating 100 world class universities, already coaxing 
high technology firms such as Intel, General Electric, and IBM to relocate some 
operations to China.75  Other domestic industries currently feeling pressure from Chinese 
imports include furniture, machined metal parts and fixtures, and some categories of 
machinery.76  Although there is no concrete link between recent job losses and Chinese 
imports, 77 a perception exists that the American labor is being supplanted by Chinese 
labor.  Taken alone, these issues would appear to support the bleak picture many paint 
regarding the trade deficit. 
China’s currency peg is often cited by those critical of Chinese trade practices as 
yet another harbinger of economic doom from Chinese shores.  However, both the 
economic benefits to the United States of the pegged yuan and China’s reaction to U.S. 
pressure to reassess its monetary practices are often lost in this criticism.  Originally 
conceived in 1997 at 8.3 yuan per dollar, the peg provides stability between the yuan and 
the dollar, increases the credibility of the China’s monetary authorities, and fosters capital 
integration with the United States.78  As the Chinese economy boomed and demand for 
its goods increased through the late 1990s and early 2000s, world demand for its currency 
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grew.79  The Chinese maintain a stable currency peg by increasing their supply of foreign 
capital reserves, frequently purchasing interest bearing U.S. Treasury securities.80  This 
has the effect of maintaining the yuan at an artificially low trading value, making Chinese 
exports less expensive than they would normally be and inflating the cost of foreign 
imports to China.  While the peg has kept the yuan undervalued, there are disagreements 
regarding the severity of undervaluation and its impact on the United States.  The 
National Association of Manufacturers, citing a 40 percent yuan undervaluation, asserts 
China’s currency manipulation is a blatant violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), acts as a de facto trade barrier for U.S. goods, and provides an unfair 
subsidy to Chinese exports.81  More modest estimates place the undervaluation in the 9.5 
to 15 percent range.82  While some small and medium sized firms competing with 
Chinese imports are negatively affected by the undervalued yuan, larger manufacturers 
who import Chinese-made components for inclusion in domestically produced products 
are experiencing increased outputs and competitiveness on world markets.83  
Furthermore, there is also evidence the peg has directly benefited the broader U.S. 
economy.  The Chinese purchase of U.S. debt obligations to support its monetary policy 
has financed the most recent American economic recovery and helped draw the fates of 
the two economies even closer together.84  This intertwining of American and Chinese 
interests may partially explain China’s acquiescence towards concerns regarding its 
monetary policy.  On 21 July 2005 China announced a 2.1 percent upward revaluation of 
the yuan, coupled with a redefinition of the currency versus a basket of world currencies 
instead of solely versus the dollar.85  This revaluation and removal of the dollar as the 
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sole defining currency could be viewed as an initial step towards a middle of the road 
compromise with American critics.  The limited monetary flexibility displays a 
willingness to assuage American concerns while allowing China time to further reform its 
underdeveloped financial system.86  If this is indeed movement towards addressing a 
contentious Sino-American economic issue, American manufacturers are hopeful this 
portends Chinese action on other concerns. 
While economic reforms provided a symbolic opening of China to the world, its 
December 2001 inclusion in the WTO could be viewed as its accession to the global 
economic mainstream after 15 years of negotiations.  Stymied due to concerns regarding 
its capacity to participate fairly in the trade regime, China achieved WTO membership 
only after negotiating a phased reduction of various tariff and non-tariff trade barriers.87  
This extended approach was designed to shield China’s reforming state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and financial sector from the sudden shock of liberalized free trade, 
allowing the nation time to adjust to the import expectations of the new regime.88  
Among the details of the agreement, China acceded to a maximum phase in period of five 
years for non-tariff barriers, with most restrictions to be lowered by 2002.89  However, 
China continues to impose various barriers to American imports, including a 
discriminatory application of value added taxes and imposition of unreasonable standards 
on certain U.S. goods.90  While these could be excused as delays to the original accession 
agreement, there are other violations of WTO standards that call into question China’s 
willingness to conform to the free trade organization it fought so hard to join.  China 
provides various financial subsidies to certain export industries, allowing Chinese goods 
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to be sold well below market prices overseas.91  The lax enforcement of intellectual 
property rights within China not only leads to unfair competition for imported American 
goods in China, but also in several regional countries that are destinations for counterfeit 
Chinese wares.92  Some have attributed China’s willingness to “bend the rules” to its 
pursuit of new found opportunity in the light of its recent history of foreign 
exploitation.93  While China is arguably still becoming acquainted with the expectations 
of the WTO, its long term reaction to these serious trade issues may indicate whether it is 
indeed seeking to enter the economic mainstream, or merely looking to have its cake and 
eat it too.  
The current Sino-American trade relationship has clearly benefited both nations.  
The loosening of state controls, the opening to foreign trade, and the attendant influx of 
foreign capital has raised the standard of living in China and, in Deng Xiaoping’s words, 
“delivered the goods” to the Chinese people.94  Conversely, the consumer oriented 
American economy has reaped an invisible economic windfall due to the ascendance of 
China.  The growing economic importance of China to the United States could help 
explain why the Bush Administration gradually moderated its stance towards China as 
the American economy faltered during the first years of the new millennium.  While there 
is obviously convergence of interests, there are several areas of contention in the 
intertwined Sino-American economic relationship.  Each nation’s participation in the 
WTO should facilitate greater cooperation and help ameliorate the issues between the two 
countries.  If the two nations work through the WTO and other economic regimes, such 
as the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), in a timely manner to address 
issues, it would suggest a triumph for liberalism.  However, China’s shortcomings vis-à-
vis WTO compliance could indicate a predisposition to defection and furthering self-
interest.  This would suggest a neo-realist approach to its economic relationship with the 
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United States and dims hopes for an institutional solution to economic issues.  Despite its 
accession to the WTO, China may still view itself as a nation threatened by outside 
economic exploitation and requiring special accommodation.  However, this 
constructivist argument loses traction when considering the lengthy vetting process China 
endured to become a WTO member and the considerations afforded after attaining 
membership.  While China has begun to address some issues, its efforts have 
occasionally been criticized for being just enough to “save face,”95 and not indicative of a 
change in attitude.     
C. RESOURCE COMPETITION:  THE QUESTION OF OIL 
The burgeoning Chinese economy has resulted in a skyrocketing demand for 
imported resources to feed and fuel its growth.  Since 1998, Chinese wood imports grew 
160 percent, iron and steel imports increased 306 percent, copper imports have grown 
377 percent, and petroleum product imports are up 616 percent.96  The dramatic 
acceleration of Chinese oil demand is of particular concern, especially when considering 
China was a net exporter of oil as recently as 1995.97  China’s appetite for oil is expected 
to escalate from its current 7.2 million barrels per day (mbd) to nearly 12.9 mbd by 
2025.98  This Chinese demand is likely to cause world petroleum prices to increase over 
the long term, especially as automobile use grows within the PRC.99  China is 
increasingly taking steps to secure its energy future which could be viewed as deleterious 
to long term U.S. interests.  
The Chinese government is the principal shareholder of the four primary 
corporations—China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petroleum & 
Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), the China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC), and China National Star Petroleum (merged with Sinopec in 2000)—
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responsible for supplying China with petroleum products.100  Each of these firms has 
increasingly sought equity stakes in oil and natural gas fields in Central Asia, the Middle 
East, Southeast Asia, Canada, and Latin America.101  While U.S. corporations also hold 
considerable equity interest in overseas oil fields, the U.S. government is not a primary 
shareholder of these corporations and thus does not possess de facto ownership of the 
fields.  The concern regarding the PRC government’s control of its oil industries is 
twofold.  First, it could signal Beijing’s discomfort with allowing market forces to dictate 
its energy prices.102  Secondly, China may view ownership as a vehicle to both extract 
political benefits from those oil producing nations, as well as an obligation to provide 
international political assistance to those same nations.103
The warming relationship between China and Iran illustrates the political concern 
borne out of an economic convenience.  Sinopec is preparing to sign a $70 billion natural 
gas agreement with Tehran that will import over 270 million tons of natural gas over the 
next 30 years.104  Iran’s deputy minister of petroleum underscored the geopolitical 
significance of this deal when he stated:  “(W)hat we have right now is trade with China, 
but when we invest in each other for 30 years, this is a marriage.”105  This impending 
marriage may have influenced China to categorically oppose military action against 
Tehran for its clandestine nuclear program, and has likely led to Beijing’s indifference 
regarding Iran’s policies on nuclear weapons and human rights.106  Beyond the political 
considerations, China’s expanding relationship with Iran shifts the Muslim nation’s 
economic focus away from the West and threatens to freeze America out of future 
hydrocarbon discoveries within Iran’s borders.107  The United States faces a similar 
dilemma closer to its shores. 
 
100 Nanto, Jackson, Morrison, and Kumins, “China and the CNOOC Bid for Unocal,” 4. 
101 Ibid., 4-5. 
102 Ibid., 5. 
103 Ibid., 5. 
104 Vivienne Walt, “Iran Looks East,” Fortune 151, no. 4, (February 21 2005):  88-89. 
105 Ibid., 88. 
106 Ibid., 92. 
107 Ibid., 92. 
29 
                                                
China’s courtship of the leftist governments in Venezuela and Brazil could 
likewise threaten U.S. access to vital oil reserves.  Underscored by the November 2004 
$10 billion energy agreement, China is increasingly engaged with Brazil’s state-owned 
oil company, Petrobras.108  The relationship being forged between Petrobras and China’s 
CNOOC includes studying the feasibility of joint operations (exploration, drilling, and 
delivery) around the world.109  Perhaps more serious, the budding Sino-Venezuelan 
energy pact could endanger vital American access to Venezuelan petroleum.  As 
American relations with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez worsened following his 
1999 election, Venezuela drew closer to the PRC.  Punctuating his disdain for America 
and the potential shift in his nation’s energy exports, Chavez stated in December 2004:  
“100 years of domination by the United States…now we are free, and place this oil at the 
disposal of the great Chinese fatherland.”110  Chavez appeared to follow through on his 
statement by signing a series of energy agreements with China on January 29, 2005.  
Among other things, the agreements commit CNPC to spend over $400 million 
developing Venezuelan oil and natural gas reserves.111  Furthermore, Venezuela’s state 
oil company is receiving Iranian tutelage on how to expand access to Asian oil 
markets.112  Like the Sino-Iranian relationship, the Sino-Venezuelan entente appears to 
exploit a political rift between the oil exporting nation and the United States, suggesting 
opportunism.  However, China’s pursuit of energy resources is not limited to American 
foes.  China is increasingly engaged with Canada to develop gas, nuclear, and oil 
sources—including huge petroleum deposits locked in Alberta’s oil sands—for mutual 
use.113  This fact is notable due to the relative disinterest American oil companies have 
shown towards the difficult to extract oil sand.  While China’s quest for energy resources 
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close to American shores is perhaps disconcerting, the mid-2005 attempt to purchase an 
American oil company raised new strategic concerns. 
On June 23, 2005, CNOOC announced an $18.5 billion cash bid for the U.S. oil 
company Unocal, topping a rival bid by U.S. Chevron by $1.5 billion.114  In its bid, 
CNOOC promised not to lay off Unocal workers (in contrast to Chevron’s proposal) and 
reassured American regulatory authorities that Unocal production in the Gulf of Mexico 
would continue to be delivered to U.S. refineries.115  CNOOC’s principal interest in 
Unocal appeared to be targeted at its Asian natural gas assets in Indonesia, Thailand, and 
the Caspian Sea basin.116  Nonetheless, CNOOC’s bid raised U.S. concerns specifically 
due to the PRC government’s controlling interest in the oil company.117  Additionally, 
U.S. lawmakers questioned the reciprocity that would be afforded a U.S. company were it 
to attempt to purchase a Chinese oil company.118    Ultimately, CNOOC rescinded its 
offer and Chevron succeeded in purchasing Unocal. 
In retrospect, CNOOC’s failed bid and the apparent competition for petroleum 
resources raise several issues that ultimately help frame the broader Sino-American 
relationship.  First, foreign ownership of oil companies is commonplace in the United 
States.  Several foreign corporations (Great Britain’s BP, the Netherlands’ Royal Dutch 
Petroleum, and Venezuela’s CITGO) control a large share of America’s production and 
refining capacity.119  The opposition CNOOC faced was borne largely out of a perception 
that China is not participating fairly in the free trade environment.  State ownership and  
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financial backing of China’s main oil companies exacerbates this perception and 
engenders mistrust among American politicians towards China.  Secondly, the rising 
global demand for oil has arguably caused each nation to address the other in a manner 
reminiscent of a neo-realist approach or Hobbesian social construction.  The mistrust 
America feels towards China causes it to fret over Chinese relationships with oil rich 
neighbors and an attempt to purchase a domestic oil company, while its own oil 
companies extract resources from areas strategically important to the Chinese.  Similarly, 
the Chinese ostensibly attempt to utilize the liberalized trade ethos to support their 
Unocal bid, while guarding their domestic oil industry from the same kind foreign 
intrusion.  Finally, opportunism appears to play a role in the growing resource 
competition, further reinforcing neo-realism or Hobbesian social construction. 
D. TRADE RELATIONSHIPS AND CHINESE LEADERSHIP 
China is increasingly utilizing its growing economic power to bolster its political 
position.  This trend is not surprising, roughly approximating the United States’ own 
global political ascendance commensurate with the growth of its economic stature.  
However, there are indications China may utilize its economic power to challenge U.S. 
interests, perhaps attempting to supplant America’s position in Asia.  Furthermore, 
China’s blending of economic and political interests increasingly confronts U.S. interests. 
Inferring China’s potential to challenge U.S. interests in Asia begins with an 
investigation into its attempts to use economic means to guide Taiwan towards PRC 
control.  A hypothetical reunion of Taiwan and the PRC is predicated upon Taiwan’s 
growing economic dependence on the mainland and the ability of China’s attractive 
economic opportunities to influence political change on the island.120  China has 
supplanted the United States as Taiwan’s largest trading partner, running an annual $51.2 
billion trade deficit with the island in 2004.121  China is also attempting to incorporate 
Taiwan in a Chinese Free Trade Area, perhaps seeing value in economic integration as a 
precursor to a political merger.122  This suggests an attempt to influence Taiwan 
politically through economic means. 
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China has made clear its political intentions regarding Taiwan.  Interestingly, the 
PRC may be attempting to employ a similar economic methodology to influence 
governments around the Pacific Rim.  As with Taiwan, China runs trade deficits with its 
Northeast Asian neighbors South Korea ($34.2 billion) and Japan ($20.7 billion).123  
Furthermore, China’s demand for raw materials has led to surging imports from 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, leading to trade deficits with 
Malaysia ($10 billion), Thailand ($5.7 billion), and the Philippines ($4.8 billion).124  Also 
similar to its Taiwan strategy, China is increasingly taking the lead in efforts to unify 
Asian trade efforts.  China is in the process of negotiating a free trade zone with ASEAN 
due to go into effect in 2010.125  Additionally, in June 2004 the Chinese Ambassador to 
Malaysia indicated his government’s interest in eventual establishment of a common 
Asian currency, potentially leading to development of a pluralistic pan-Asian 
arrangement analogous to the European Union.126  One could argue that China’s 
participation in multilateral regimes is encouraging and will help moderate less desirable 
aspects of the PRC.  However, it is possible China will seek to dominate a pan-Asian 
economic arrangement.  This is particularly notable when considering Chinese analyst 
Wang Yizhou’s statement in a 2000 article that in the future China should be “exercising 
positive and increasingly dominant influence in the Asia-Pacific region and working to 
become a globally influential country.”127  Furthermore, former Singapore Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew has predicted East Asia will move towards an economic system 
where China will become the leading agent.128  Whether Chinese ascendance to an 
economic leadership position in Asia would signal problems for American interests is 
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debatable.  On one hand, leadership in a multilateral framework would provide checks 
and balances that would likely encourage strong continued American participation in the 
pan-Asian economy.  On the other hand, supplanting America’s position as arguably the 
leading economic power in the region could lead to an erosion of political prestige and 
influence.  If China does achieve the economic leadership position, how will it lead?  
Recent examples call into question Chinese objectivity in the face of economic gain, 
perhaps suggesting ulterior motives.     
China has shown a predilection towards abuse of its position as a leader at the 
United Nations.  In two instances, China appears to have sought economic 
aggrandizement at the expense of its Security Council responsibilities.  As one of five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, China had direct control over the Iraq 
Oil-for-Food (OFF) Program.  Ostensibly existing for humanitarian reasons, the OFF 
Program allowed Saddam Hussein to launder more than $10 billion for personal use, 
often to purchase weapons prohibited under UN sanctions.129  Saddam’s top three trading 
partners under the OFF Program were France ($2.9 billion), Russia ($2.6 billion), and 
China ($1.3 billion),130  suggesting a measure of culpability in the corrupt program by the 
three members.131  Given Iran’s bellicose rhetoric towards Israel and its likely links to 
organized terrorist groups, its clandestine nuclear program presents a clear and present 
danger to world peace.  However, China appears ready to subvert threatened UN 
sanctions designed to curb Iran’s actions.  Lu Chang Jin, a Chinese diplomat in Iran 
underscored his government’s attitude when he said:  “We don’t care about the sanctions, 
and I don’t think the Chinese government cares…we don’t believe politics should be a 
part of business.”132
E. SUMMARY 
China is an ascending economic power with growing political clout throughout 
the Pacific Rim and around the world.  China’s comparative advantage with respect to the 
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United States and other developed economies provides it with a natural trade surplus that 
fuels its acquisition of foreign monetary reserves.  Conversely, its resource dependency 
requires it to apply these reserves towards securing its energy security.  The likelihood of 
purely economic issues fomenting discord between the United States and China appears 
remote.  Axelrod and Keohane note that shadow of the future considerations make 
negotiated settlements more likely in economic matters.133  Since the losing side on an 
economic concern would almost certainly be able to retaliate later, it stands to reason that 
both sides should seek a cooperative resolution.  While economic issues do not 
necessarily portend ill between the United States and China, they provide a context where 
challenges could arise.  China appears to utilize the free trade mantra when convenient to 
suit its interests, but appears less accommodating when it does not benefit the PRC.  
Despite China’s participation in various international economic and political regimes and 
integration into the world economic community, there are indications it is prone to 
defection to maximize national gain.  China’s comparatively slow reaction to WTO 
expectations is similarly mirrored in its economic-borne political support of rogue 
regimes such as Iran.  The international community’s economic interest in China appears 
to enable the PRC to flout certain rules, reinforcing China’s predilection towards self 
interest.  As China continues to leverage its economic growth for political gain, it is 
probable this pattern will continue.  This suggests a neo-realist approach towards 
economic interests.   
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IV. SINO-AMERICAN SOCIO-POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The socio-political relationship between the United States and China has changed 
considerably since the creation of the PRC.  Originally bitter ideological enemies, each 
has somewhat moderated its position vis-à-vis the other.  The Sino-American 
rapprochement of the 1970s not only brought these two Cold War rivals closer together, 
it helped lead China toward the global political mainstream.  This mainstreaming 
included supplanting the ROC on the United Nation’s Security Council as a permanent 
member with veto power.  Through the 1980s, China simultaneously took steps toward 
developing international economic and political clout.  However, China’s integration into 
the world’s political structure faltered following its reaction to the Tiananmen Square 
protests.  Long interested in seeing the internal Chinese political landscape change, the 
United States took a particularly harsh view of the June 1989 events in Beijing.134  The 
corresponding sanctions and condemnation reflected international disappointment in 
China’s capacity to conform to norms of behavior expected of a responsible United 
Nations member.  While China’s economic success through the 1990s spurred its global 
political recovery,135 doubts continue to linger, particularly within the United States, 
about China’s willingness to accede to accepted norms of international behavior. 
Adding to American concern is China’s mercurial political strategy.  Beijing 
maintains a calculated strategic ambiguity in its actions in an attempt to influence policies 
of international governments and the attitudes of foreign citizens.136  While China 
publicly presents a non-threatening image with statements advocating its peaceful 
development and eschewing the use of force in settling international disputes, it 
maintains ambitious, less widely acknowledged national objectives that could be viewed 
with consternation by the global community.137  Deng Xiaoping’s “24-character strategy” 
provides insight into the nature of Chinese political maneuverings:  “keep cool-headed to 
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observe, be composed to make reactions, stand firmly, hide our capabilities and bide our 
time, never try to take the lead, and be able to accomplish something.”138  Thus, it is 
possible that China seeks more than its stated goal of building a modernized, moderately 
prosperous society.139
Conversely, China feels increasing socio-political pressure from the United States 
that could sour the potential for closer relations.  Over the past fifteen years, the United 
States has sent a series of mixed messages on how it views China.  Following the 
Tiananmen Square massacre, the United States imposed trade sanctions and led the 
global condemnation of China’s actions.  However, President George H. W. Bush 
blocked draconian Congressional initiatives to preserve basic trade and other relations, 
preventing a return to isolation for the PRC.140  Presidential candidate William Clinton 
harshly criticized both the Bush administration’s “soft” policy and the Chinese 
themselves.141  Following a somewhat aimless initial approach to Sino-American 
relations during the early part of the Clinton administration,142 United States pursued a 
liberal institutionalist policy of strategic engagement and business investment in China 
during the late 1990s.143  This is contrasted by the George W. Bush administration’s 
early neo-realist policy, sometimes referred to as “congagement,” that emphasizes 
containment over engagement.144  Much has been written criticizing the current 
administration’s hawkish stance towards China.  However, the argument can be made 
that the previous administration did not actually forge the trust with China typically 
assumed.  The “strategic ambiguity” historically pursued by American policy makers 
regarding Taiwan145 and repeated American insistence on human rights reforms146 have 
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and continue to irk Chinese leaders and present an obstacle toward greater cooperation.  
Additionally, the Chinese perceive American exceptionalism driving U.S. hopes for a 
“peaceful evolution” of the communist nation.147  The end result of these pressures is a 
level of distrust within the Chinese government towards the United States.  Whatever the 
cause, the engagement pursued by the Clinton administration and improved economic 
relationship have not moderated China’s perception based on strategic considerations that 
the United States is its principal obstacle to greater regional and global military 
influence.148  This perception is likely driving current trends in Chinese foreign relations. 
While the veiled unpredictability of Chinese intentions raises concern for the 
United States, America appears to the Chinese to be constraining their ascendance.  
These perceptions frame the broader socio-political relationship between the United 
States and China and suggest individual self interest clouding the potential for a more 
cooperative relationship between the two nations.  Ideological differences and the rise of 
Chinese socio-political power present areas of contention between the two nations at 
present.  While amelioration of the Taiwan question may appear to improve the Sino-
American relationship, it could just as easily open additional areas of concern.  
B. IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES:  THE QUESTION OF FREEDOM 
Although China has embraced greater economic liberalism, it has not similarly 
embraced broad socio-political reform.  China remains a nation ruled by a communist 
party that occasionally employs repressive methods to maintain its primacy.  This fact 
introduces a fissure in the Sino-American relationship. 
The United States has defined its position as a global champion of greater 
freedom and human dignity.  The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States 
emphasizes: 
In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we stand for:  
the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles 
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are right and true for all people everywhere.  No nation owns these 
aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them.149 
The American historical legacy of individual liberty and preservation of basic rights 
provides a societal basis for this perceived responsibility to spread freedom and justice 
throughout the world.  The United States has utilized international regimes, such as the 
United Nations, to further this goal and occasionally places high emphasis on freedom 
and human rights issues in its bilateral relations with other states.  The American 
relationship with China is an example where the United States says that it places a high 
premium on political and human rights reform.  The United States pointedly asserts 
China is not presently on the correct national path according to the American ethos: 
We welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China.  
The democratic development of China is crucial to that future.  Yet, a 
quarter century after shedding the worst features of the Communist legacy, 
China’s leaders have not yet made the next series of fundamental choices 
about the character of their state. … Only by allowing the Chinese people 
to think, assemble, and worship freely can China reach its full potential.150 
This American concern over China’s internal reform may help fuel American angst 
regarding China’s ability to conform to American democratic ideals. 
Not surprisingly, China bristles at American criticism, particularly in light of the 
apparent double standard in American foreign policy.  The Bush administration has made 
democratic nascency a pillar of his foreign policy.151  However, this policy goal often 
conflicts with political reality as America finds itself supporting oppressive regimes that 
assuage security or economic concerns.152  This tends to damage American credibility 
when calling on Beijing to institute democratic reforms.  Meanwhile, China is 
championing its limited political reforms as indicative of its willingness to accede to 
norms of behavior.  In the mid-1980s, the Communist government authorized democratic 
local elections in the nation’s impoverished rural areas and somewhat diffused power 
among Chinese governing institutions on the national level.153  Despite these limited 
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reforms, China maintained the primacy of party rule for the national government.  China 
recently published a white paper on the results of its limited foray into democracy.  While 
admitting China has an incomplete political democracy, the paper lauded the value of 
party rule in allowing the Chinese people “to become masters of their own country and 
society.”154  Noted Chinese specialist Richard Baum postulated that Chinese leaders fear 
the nascent desire for political change within China would lead to a torrent of deleterious 
social expression if further democratic reforms were enacted.155  The government 
apparently utilizes this pretext to constrain further political change at the moment.  
Additionally, China employs the same rationale to perpetuate human rights abuses, 
despite running counter to American ideals for international standards of behavior.  
Attempting to sway the International Olympic Committee, Liu Jingmin, Vice President of 
the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee, stated “(b)y allowing Beijing to host 
the Games you will help the development of human rights.”156  China appeared to 
address international concerns regarding human rights reforms when the Chinese 
constitution was amended in March 2004 with the statement “the state respects and 
safeguards human rights.”157  Yet China continues to violate internationally accepted 
norms by stifling freedom of expression, jailing and torturing political activists, denying 
freedom of association, and imposing punishment without benefit of an independent and 
impartial judiciary.158  Furthermore, China restricts access of international human rights 
organizations from researching human rights activities and providing a watch dog 
capacity.159  This suggests the Chinese government utilizes a two-fold approach to 
human rights.  On one hand the government curries international favor with promises of 
change, while making only those reforms the government feels it can comfortably 
accommodate given the social landscape. 
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Based on these differing national viewpoints, a logical conclusion would suggest 
difficulty in the political relationship between the United States and China.  Each nation’s 
government appears to have strongly held beliefs regarding the value of freedom and 
human rights.  Furthermore, Chinese actions suggest possible duplicity, further 
confounding those interested in seeing China accede to international norms.  A peaceful 
resolution of the Taiwan Strait issue, without genuine internal PRC reform, would seem 
to negate improved Sino-American relations. 
C. THE RISE OF CHINESE SOCIO-POLITICAL POWER:  ISSUES FOR 
THE UNITED STATES 
The cyclical nature of the Sino-American relationship has continued in the recent 
past, manifested by distrust of each player’s intentions.  This suggests a situation 
whereby the future of the relationship will possibly involve acrimony.  Whether or not 
China is indeed a threat to American interests is best answered by considering the relative 
position of China to the United States.  As a status quo power, the United States seeks to 
maintain the current world situation, while China, as a revisionist power, seeks to raise its 
relative position.160  Avoiding conflict between these two competing powers would 
appear to rest on bringing China closer to the international community and building 
trust.161  Despite participation by both countries in regional and extra-regional 
multilateral regimes, each appears to be following a neo-realist approach or Hobbesian 
construction toward the other. 
1. China’s International Maneuverings 
Chinese foreign policy has historically taken a neo-realist tack in that entangling 
alliances and multilateral commitments are avoided as they restrict China’s capacity for 
independent maneuver.162  Considering this and the Chinese aptitude at playing 
adversaries off against each other,163 one could look at recent events in Chinese foreign 
policy with a jaundiced eye.  Chinese Premier Jiang Zemin formulated the “major power 
strategy” (MPS) based on former Premier Deng Xiaoping’s two fold admonishment to 
avoid leadership positions in international relations and to “keep one’s head down”— 
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avoid confrontations in power politics.164  Following the Chinese embassy bombing in 
1999 and the domestic political-military fallout that ensued, Chinese foreign policy 
shifted towards the “good neighborly diplomacy,” whereby China placated surrounding 
countries so they would not join the United States in containing the Chinese.165  It is 
interesting to note that this is not the first time the Chinese have attempted this strategy.  
In the mid-1950s, Beijing made an unsuccessful attempt to persuade countries in 
Southeast Asia to abandon Western alliances in favor of an Asian-centric partnership 
with China.166
Despite their historical aversion towards multilateral regimes, the Chinese are 
increasingly utilizing such arrangements, so long as they serve Chinese interests.  Within 
the Asia-Pacific region, the “good neighborly diplomacy” may be driving China’s 
growing association with regional multilateral organizations, notably ASEAN (including 
ASEAN+3—AESAN nations plus China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea) and the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and could explain the June 2004 suggestion by the 
Chinese ambassador to Malaysia for the eventual establishment of a common Asian 
currency and development of a pluralistic pan-Asian society.167  The departure from the 
MPS reinforces the historical trend of China as a central actor in policy.  While the PRC 
has historically frowned upon multilateral commitments, its current involvement with 
ASEAN is less a binding commitment than an association designed to bring China closer 
to regional nations.168  A possible conclusion from current Chinese actions, contrasted 
against historical views, is an interest in using international institutions such as ASEAN 
and ARF to balance U.S. interests in the Pacific by playing Asian nations off against the 
American hegemon.  If China is indeed courting its regional neighbors with this intent, it 
suggests a neo-realist strategy. 
The Bush administration’s policy of congagement is attributable to concerns over 
growing Chinese influence in the region and the implications on U.S. interests.  The 
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RAND Corporation has recommended continued containment of China along with 
multilateral engagement to coax China’s acceptance of international norms.169  
Furthermore, the recommendation also calls for strengthening U.S. bilateral alliances, 
notably with Japan, and in encouraging pan-Asian security dialogue that would evolve 
into a security framework.170  This would appear to support a shift towards a cooler 
American foreign policy towards China while encouraging Japan to become 
independently involved in regional affairs. 
While China arguably challenges American influence in the Asia-Pacific, it is 
increasingly flexing its international muscle outside the region.  China has leveraged its 
economic clout to influence American neighbors in the Western hemisphere.  
Relationships with Canada, Venezuela, and Brazil reflect Chinese demand for natural 
resources such as oil and could indicate a Chinese desire to secure resources at the 
source, rather than in a market environment.  Most of these Chinese relations tend to 
assuage certain Chinese interests.171  These interests often include political objectives 
that may run counter to U.S. interests.  For example, Beijing may be actively courting 
Latin American nations with the intent of diplomatically isolating Taiwan.  Twelve Latin 
American nations recognize the Taiwanese government, but Chinese economic 
enticements could shift their perspective.172  Dominica and Grenada have already broken 
ties with Taiwan following Chinese promises of assistance.173  Furthermore, following 
reversion of the Panama Canal to Panamanian control in 1997, a Hong Kong company 
successfully bid for a contract controlling ports on both the Atlantic and Pacific 
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entrances, raising American concerns of Chinese control of the strategic waterway.174  
The obvious fear is acquiescence to Chinese goals among America’s neighbors, 
jeopardizing American interests. 
The United States ostensibly welcomes the rise of a peaceful and prosperous 
China.175  However, some of China’s less desirable political decisions have caused 
increasing consternation within Washington and other allied capitals.  China frequently 
takes a value neutral approach to its relations, leading to nefarious collaborations with 
rogue regimes and extra-national figures.176  China has a considerable track record of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology proliferation to the Middle East and 
South Asia.177  Despite assurances that it is changing its practices, proliferated Chinese 
WMD technology may be threatening U.S. forces in Korea and the Middle East.178  At 
best, this behavior would seem to indicate a reluctance to follow American perceived 
international norms of behavior for a responsible nation, casting doubt on China’s ability 
to participate honestly in the international community.  At worst, this behavior could be a 
calculated decision to destabilize certain areas in an attempt to distract an American 
hegemon for Chinese gain.  China’s close relationship with North Korea represents a 
potential opportunity to exercise responsible participation in a multilateral effort to 
diffuse a global flashpoint.  As North Korea’s sole military ally and principal trading 
partner, China holds considerable sway over the reclusive regime.  Indeed, China has 
been instrumental in drawing North Korea to the 2005 six-party talks and was intimately 
involved in drafting the first joint statement where North Korea would agree to dismantle 
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its nuclear program.179  However, North Korea’s continued intransigence, coupled with 
Beijing’s continued provisioning of the Kim Jong Il regime, raises questions regarding 
China’s willingness to apply necessary pressure to resolve the lingering crisis.180  While 
Beijing has an overriding national interest in preventing a North Korean collapse and the 
attendant humanitarian crisis, its actions also perpetuate a difficult issue for American 
foreign policy and could cast doubt on  American political credibility.     
2. The Growing Sino-American Soft Power Competition 
Consistent with its efforts to moderate attitudes within China and foster greater 
openness within the communist nation, the United States utilizes cultural soft power—in 
the form of popular culture and cultural ideals—to coax acquiescence to the status quo.  
A parallel American strategy is to keep the Asia-Pacific region predominantly pro-
American, thus facilitating bandwagoning and containment of China.  Conversely, China 
has shown increasing capacity of its own to employ soft power to raise its relative 
position by appealing to regional nations.  This may be viewed as an effort to whittle 
away at American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.  Furthermore, China could arguably be 
seeking to moderate American views of China and similarly attempt passive encirclement 
of the United States. 
The marketization of China exposed the nation to the globalizing effects of the 
world economy.  This provided the opportunity for American soft power to penetrate the 
communist nation and make startling inroads into the national consciousness.  During the 
1980s, the rapid Chinese economic growth created alternating periods of social 
liberalization and government retrenchment to halt loss of control—the so-called fang-
shou (letting go and tightening up) cycle.181   During the social liberalization cycles, 
authors wrote books and articles critical of the government, Western style rock bands 
singing protest music sprang up in urban areas, American movies and popular culture 
gained acceptance, and Western dress and social life came into vogue.  Furthermore, the 
United States actively supplemented these indirect methods of soft power with direct 
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“marketing” such as Voice of America and Radio Free Asia designed to perpetuate the 
universality of American ideals.182  Ironically, these effects occurred during a period 
when China and the United States had somewhat drifted apart politically, suggesting the 
asymmetric effectiveness of soft power.  The exposure to Western influences served as a 
catalyst for change within China, aiding the late 1980s student protests culminating in the 
1989 Tiananmen Square showdown with the government.  An example of the 
effectiveness of American soft power penetration played out before the world when 
Tiananmen Square democracy protesters erected an effigy called “The Goddess of 
Democracy,” an homage to the Statue of Liberty. 
The Chinese crackdown that followed the Tiananmen Square protests, broadcast 
via international media outlets, brought worldwide condemnation for China’s abuse of 
human rights.  Although less than one thousand Chinese perished in the response, China 
arguably received harsher international backlash for Tiananmen Square than it had 
following the repressive Cultural Revolution debacle where an estimated five hundred 
thousand died between 1966 and 1969.  Through this experience, the Chinese not only 
gained an appreciation for the immediacy telecommunication media presents, but also the 
pervasiveness cultural exports in altering a social landscape.  This negative experience 
with the global influence of soft power served as a learning experience for the next 
generation of Chinese leaders. 
The communist government of China clearly faced a problem due to the social 
liberalization and permeation of outside influences ushered in by economic reforms.  
Furthermore, China abruptly discovered the power of the global media as broadcasts of 
the Tiananmen Square massacre brought international sanctions.  However, China was 
well prepared to meet this challenge as it maintains considerable control within its 
borders with respect to the broadcast message.  The state-controlled media in China have 
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been described as the “throat and tongue” of the party since their inception.183   This 
means that anything reported by an organization such as Xinhua (the official news 
agency of the Chinese government) is propaganda, potentially blunting the effects of 
foreign soft power.  During the 1990s, the communist party embraced nationalism as a 
method of gaining support for the party.  Such nationalistic propaganda continues today, 
as evidenced by the highly inflammatory Chinese reporting of a July 2004 incident 
involving a Chinese businesswoman mistakenly attacked and apprehended by American 
FBI agents in Niagara Falls, New York.  Although the incident received little coverage in 
the West, Chinese news outlets ran numerous hard news, op-ed, and personal interest 
stories targeted at Chinese citizens at home and abroad.184,185   These articles not only 
derided American human rights actions in an attempt to impeach American cultural 
values, they directly engaged the nationalist spirit of Chinese citizens with an “us against 
them” message.  Appealing to traditional values, nationalist efforts have had the effect of 
rallying the nation against perceived outside enemies and blunted the effectiveness of 
American soft power. 
While American soft power has affected the social landscape within China, 
American strategy vis-à-vis China also seeks to maintain pro-American attitudes within 
the Asia-Pacific neighborhood.  The United States is well positioned to utilize soft power 
to further this end.  Joseph Nye identifies a trinity of characteristics required for nations 
to be capable of employing soft power in the global information age:  1) possession of a 
dominant culture whose ideas are closer to prevailing international norms; 2) access to 
multiple channels of communication, facilitating issue framing; and 3) credibility 
enhanced through domestic and international performance.186   The United States’ active 
participation in several Asian multilateral institutions such as the ASEAN Regional 
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Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) helps reinforce the 
concept that American ideals are in line with the prevailing international norms.  
Ubiquitous American media such as CNN and the Associated Press promote favorable 
framing of issues pertinent to the United States.  Within the Asia-Pacific, this favorable 
framing includes extensive coverage of such events as American-provided tsunami relief 
in early 2005.  This outpouring of American aid through financial, logistical, and physical 
assistance served as a powerful reminder for many Asians of the American commitment 
to the region.187   Such international actions reinforce American credibility.  These 
examples show the United States is adroitly utilizing soft power to its advantage in the 
Asia Pacific, but how exactly does this affect the Sino-American relationship? 
In addition to moderating Chinese views to facilitate their acceptance of the status 
quo, the United States is interested in maintaining the status quo around China.  This 
translates into a pro-American attitude that will promote bandwagoning with American 
interests.  Keeping the region in the American corner will thus hinder the Chinese from 
challenging American interests abroad.  The aim of this containment reinforces the goal 
of encouraging Chinese acceptance of the status quo and preservation of America’s 
position. 
While America pursues soft power means to facilitate political ends, China is 
increasingly interested in applying the same tactic.  Beyond the recent memories of 
Tiananmen Square, the Chinese have a considerable image problem within the Asia-
Pacific.  China’s 1979 invasion of Vietnam conjured up images of an ancient middle 
kingdom asserting its will through force, and memories of the mania associated with the 
Cultural Revolution continue to echo in the region’s consciousness.  The PRC response 
has been to build upon its recent economic gains in an attempt to instill greater respect for 
China and produce a sense of fascination with the success experienced over the past 
twenty five years.  The goal is to translate this “buzz” into real international clout that can 
aid Chinese foreign policy in the long term.188   In some respects, China is emulating the 
path pursued by the United States in the post-World War II era—leveraging economic 
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success to create a magnetic effect that attracts and influences other nations.  Recent 
examples such as the extravagant January 2004 French courtship of Chinese favor189 
strongly suggest the Chinese are succeeding in creating a “buzz” that is attracting 
international attention. 
Within the Asia-Pacific region, China is capitalizing on its successes to 
effectively counter American containment efforts.  Beijing is moving with renewed 
confidence as it assuages neighbors’ fears of a menacing Chinese dragon and bolsters 
growing ties, particularly in Southeast Asia.  China appears to be utilizing its growing 
stature to influence the political landscape of the region as a whole, and perhaps 
maneuvering the Asia-Pacific towards eventual Chinese leadership.  During the fall 2003 
APEC summit, the Chinese message of Asian solidarity and increasing Chinese 
investment in the region overshadowed President Bush’s message of anti-terror.190   The 
Chinese followed this up with a June 2004 call for the eventual establishment of a 
common Asian currency and development of a pan-Asian society.191
While these examples show growth of Chinese influence through international 
actions and hint at Chinese acceptance of international norms, China still exhibits 
shortcomings in its exercise of soft power.  Following the Indonesian tsunami, China 
appeared lost in the competitive international race to provide aid.  Its final pledge of $83 
million looked just as paltry as its opening sum of $3 million, when compared to pledges 
approaching $1 billion from other major donor nations.192  Furthermore, the United 
States clearly upstaged China through America’s employment of hard power military 
assets in a soft power role.  Beyond freshman errors regarding international performance 
that somewhat tarnish credibility, China lags behind the United States in the first and 
second of Nye’s national characteristics necessary for soft power employment:  
possession of a dominant culture and access to media outlets for the purpose of message 
framing.  Nonetheless, there are indications that this too is changing. 
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Although state control of Chinese media allows it to effectively shape domestic 
opinion, its propagandistic nature dilutes the veracity of its message in foreign capitals.  
Nevertheless, China is increasingly taking a proactive approach towards shaping its 
media message abroad.  This point is illustrated by Li Kun, associate professor at the 
Peking University School of Journalism and Communication, who states:  “No other 
country in the world today spends as much money and manpower as China does just to 
create an image.”193   The May 2005 expulsion of forty Chinese officials and journalists 
from Harvard’s Nieman Foundation underscores both the aggressive approach China is 
taking to frame issues pertinent to the PRC, as well as the ambivalence such actions 
generate among those in the liberal Western press.  The Chinese journalists were due to 
attend training at Harvard, ostensibly to understand the operation of the free press in 
preparation for the invasion of foreign correspondents on China leading up to the 2008 
Beijing Olympics.194  However, alumni of the Harvard program successfully protested, 
arguing the real intent of the training was to facilitate manipulation of Western media for 
Chinese interests.195  Beijing targets expatriate Chinese citizens with native language 
propaganda, hoping to employ their voices to shape opinion in such Western nations as 
the United States.196  Although China lacks the plethora of communication channels at 
U.S. disposal, convincing evidence exists that China is utilizing those avenues available 
to frame a pro-China message with the intent of shaping Western opinion.  Additionally, 
China is arguably moving forward to create a culturally dominant society. 
Part of the basis of American soft power is the appeal of its popular culture.  This 
attraction helps facilitate the dispersion of American ideals and helps create a positive 
image of the United States.  At present, China does not export a ubiquitous soft drink 
such as Coca Cola, nor does the world watch a Chinese equivalent of “The Simpsons.”  
Nonetheless, China is taking steps to showcase all things Chinese in an attempt to project 
a Chinese message into the global consciousness.  China is spending millions of dollars 
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on public relations abroad and has instructed its consular offices to aggressively promote 
Chinese cultural exports.197  The effect of this public relations push could be responsible 
for the growing interjection of Chinese influence into the American experience.  From 
Chinese movie stars such as Jackie Chan and Zhang Ziyi, to Chinese-born “Mission 
Impossible 2” director John Woo, to movies such as “Mulan” and “Crouching Tiger, 
Hidden Dragon” depicting Chinese settings, China is making inroads into American 
popular culture.  Beyond using Chinese actors and directors, Hollywood is increasingly 
looking to mainland China as a source of opportunity.  Several major American television 
and movie studios have signed joint ventures with China Central TV and China Film 
Group.198  The net result of these business deals could be a two-fold windfall for China 
as it could perpetuate the gradual permeation of Chinese culture into American media, as 
well as professionalizing the entertainment and media industry in China.  Perhaps the 
biggest public relations project currently facing China is its hosting of the 2008 Olympics 
in Beijing.  China clearly recognizes the importance of this opportunity and is taking 
steps to ensure the world sees a vibrant, cosmopolitan China in 2008.  These efforts are 
targeted at shaping foreign public opinion, particularly in the United States. 
Beyond the cultural attraction China is creating, America is increasingly invested 
in Chinese business.  This has had the interesting effect of splitting so called “blue team” 
conservatives, who favor a restrictive approach to the PRC, from business conservatives 
who favor closer relations with China.199  Joseph Nye summarizes the potential concern 
this culmination of issues present to American foreign policy:  “When a country gets very 
popular with the American public, it gets somewhat harder for Washington to follow a 
hard line against them.”200   One could conclude that China is employing the same soft 
power tactics the United States has embraced in the past in an attempt to alter American 
social perceptions vis-à-vis China. 
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The net impact of the active use of soft power by both the United States and 
China would seem to suggest a vehicle towards positive social construction in each 
nation.  Indeed, altering public perceptions of each other’s rival could result in new found 
areas of cooperation and common ground.  However, the nature of this soft power 
competition suggests neo-realist competition, not cooperative social construction.  Each 
nation is attempting to shape the other’s opinion based on its own interests.  Furthermore, 
the restrictive nature of the Chinese government suggests a desire to quash certain foreign 
messages that could threaten its hold on power.  Chinese censorship raises questions 
about its willingness to accept international norms of behavior.  Beyond the soft power 
discussion, both the United States and China appear to view the other as an obstacle to its 
power.  The measures each has taken to preserve or raise its position further reinforce the 
concept of a relationship based on neo-realist suppositions.  It would appear that despite 
China’s increasing participation in international regimes that the United States and China 
will continue this competitive pattern.   
D. ELIMINATION OF THE TAIWAN QUESTION:  THE POLITICAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
The prospect of a peaceful ROC-PRC merger would appear to eliminate a source 
of considerable political friction between the United States and China, particularly if the 
United States played a role in facilitating reunification.  The United States may attempt to 
pursue a negotiator’s position in such an arrangement for one of several reasons.  First, 
the United States could see reunification as a means towards internal political reform 
within a unified China.  The United States could leverage its position with Taiwan to 
broker a merger that not only improves the economic and security situation throughout 
East Asia, but fosters democratic reforms within the PRC.  Another possibility could 
involve an American realization that the integrative forces of cross-Strait trade and 
investment make the status quo untenable.201  In this situation, the United States may 
take a mediator’s position to foster improved Sino-American relations, thus capitalizing 
on inevitability.  A third, far less likely reason for the United States to facilitate 
reunification would be to avert a cross-Strait military crisis that could threaten peace and 
prosperity throughout the Pacific Rim.202  Under such a scenario, the United States may 
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consider it better to mediate a reunification than to risk a potential war with the PRC by 
supporting Taiwan.  This third rationale is deemed unlikely as it runs counter to the intent 
of both the Taiwan Relations Act and the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United 
States.203  Furthermore, Chinese bellicosity toward resolving the Taiwan issue is likely to 
raise, not lower political friction between the United States and China.  One could 
conclude that the United States would actively engage in Sino-Taiwanese reunification if 
it provided some tangible post-reunification benefit.  It is also logical to assume that U.S. 
engagement in the reunification process would entail American expectations of the 
Chinese, particularly in the first example.  While the PRC would undoubtedly welcome 
reunification with Taiwan, it is possible it would chafe at foreign interference in its 
matters. 
The 1997 assimilation of Hong Kong into the PRC presents a historical example 
of how China may react to foreign meddling.  In 1982, Great Britain and China began 
negotiations on the issue of Hong Kong sovereignty.  British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher initially asked for an extension of the New Territories lease due to the 
prosperity the territory had enjoyed under British rule.204  Thatcher was summarily 
rebuffed by Deng Xiaoping, who threatened use of force to reacquire Hong Kong.205  
Despite this tension, Great Britain and China arrived at a satisfactory compromise 
regarding the economic and political future of the former colony—the “One Country, 
Two Systems” arrangement.  Within this compromise, codified in the 1984 Sino-British 
Joint Declaration, Great Britain ceded its interest, while China agreed to allow the 
existing capitalist economic system and British rule of law within the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region for a period of 50 years after hand over.206  However, China 
displayed increasing rancor with outgoing British governor Chris Patten in his mid-1990s 
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reform efforts.207  China acquiesced to agreements made under the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration, but later resisted Patten’s efforts to instill durable democratic processes in 
Hong Kong’s political system.208  This followed a pattern of frustration with, 
confrontation with, and repudiation of Patten’s efforts.209  Concerns regarding Hong 
Kong’s status continue.  In August 2005 the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission visited Hong Kong and noted serious constraints imposed by the PRC on 
Hong Kong’s political development designed to stifle democratic development.210  
Additionally, Beijing’s restrictions are eroding the autonomy Hong Kong was supposed 
to enjoy under the 1984 Joint Agreement.211  While China was arguably justified in 
objecting to Patten’s after the fact meddling, it shows the confrontational nature China 
pursues regarding something deemed an internal Chinese matter.  Furthermore, China’s 
current actions could signal some reneging on previous commitments. 
Regardless of whether the United States was involved in fostering a ROC-PRC 
merger, it is probable America would hope to guarantee the political future of the 
reunified Taiwan.  In much the same way that Great Britain attempted to transform Hong 
Kong’s political system through Patten’s efforts, the United States could attempt to 
preserve Taiwan’s democratic institutions if China offered the expected “One Country, 
Two Systems” proposal for Taiwan.212  This is especially likely given America’s close 
relationship with Taiwan and its commitment to democratic political systems.  However, 
China has historically resisted American interference in the Taiwan issue beyond 
occasionally reining in the island’s independence minded government.  The PRC 
contends the United States should not meddle in Chinese affairs with Taiwan.213  In 
China’s eyes, the vocal pro-Taiwan lobby in Washington not only perpetuates the status 
 
207 Timothy J. Lynch, “The Five Phases of China’s Hong Kong Policy,” (student dissertation, Boston 
College, Summer 1996), 1. 
208 Ibid., 1-2. 
209 Ibid., 2-3. 
210 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2005 Report to Congress, 151. 
211 Ibid., 151. 
212 Tucker, “If Taiwan Chooses Unification,” 22. 
213 Joseph Kahn, “Beijing Urges Bush to Act to Forestall Taiwan Vote,” The New York Times, 6 
February 2004, sec. A, p. 3. 
54 
                                                
quo, but emboldens Taiwanese thoughts of independence.214  It is possible that U.S. 
engagement in a reunified Taiwan would be viewed by China as having ulterior motives.  
E. SUMMARY 
While the socio-political relationship between the United States and China has 
noticeably improved since the early Cold War years, it still maintains a level of suspicion 
and overt competition.  Differences in basic attitudes towards individual liberty and 
human rights provide an ideological undercurrent that affects the broader relationship.  
China’s economy is clearly fueling its rise in regional and global prominence.  This has 
allowed China to gain a measure of credibility through international actions and leverage 
its burgeoning economic clout for political gain.  China is increasingly focused on 
strengthening the other two legs of Nye’s trinity.  This is being done not only to counter 
American influence within and around China, but also to apply the same pressure on the 
United States.  China is still learning the ropes of the soft power game, but appears to 
have adroitly played its hand thus far.  However, China is still an authoritarian nation.  
This fact enables China to maintain a stranglehold on its own populace, but sounds off 
key when China espouses its commitment to international norms of behavior.  Peaceful 
reunification with Taiwan provides a potential opportunity for improved Sino-American 
relations, but could also reveal new areas of contention. 
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V. SINO-AMERICAN MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION  
The United States and China last faced each other militarily during the stalemated 
Korean conflict over fifty years ago.  Ironically, some Chinese leaders briefly explored 
alignment with the United States prior to that conflict, ultimately siding with the Soviet 
Union due to ideological similarities.215  The conflict helped solidify the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) control over the country as the Chinese people found pride in 
the way Chinese forces acquitted themselves versus a Western foe.216  Although the two 
nations have since avoided overt conflict, each has viewed the other with caution and a 
measure of military suspicion.  This mutual distrust appears to be borne out of realist 
concerns on both sides.  China scholar Paul H. B. Godwin notes that China’s military 
posture reflects a “fundamental apprehension of U.S. power and military presence both 
globally and in the Asia-Pacific region,” causing the PRC to seek regional military 
dominance to assuage its security concerns vis-à-vis the United States.217  Conversely, 
U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recently underscored American concern 
regarding burgeoning Chinese military power when he stated “A number of countries 
with interests in the region are asking questions about China’s intentions.”218  If this 
statement belies American angst regarding China’s military power, it would appear to 
validate the maintenance of a robust American military presence around China’s 
periphery.219
In May 2001, Zalmay Khalilzad and other RAND analysts published a 
comprehensive Asian security report calling for strengthened U.S. based bilateral military 
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alliances and creation of balance of power structures, notably against China.220  In light 
of the tensions created by the April 2001 EP-3 incident, reports of Chinese acquisition of 
sensitive U.S. nuclear secrets and occasional Chinese saber rattling regarding Taiwan, 
this report appeared to support the George W. Bush administration’s initially bellicose 
stance towards China.  In the weeks that followed, Admiral Dennis Blair, commander of 
the U.S. Pacific Command, helped focus discussion on a principal question:  whether 
China, as an emerging power, would conform to international norms of behavior or 
attempt to set up its own rules.221  While removal of the Taiwan corollary from the Sino-
American equation would appear to mitigate military concerns between the two nations, 
other factors exist that complicate the relationship.  As one of the “four modernizations” 
initially proposed by Zhou Enlai in 1964, Chinese military modernization has created 
concern within the United States and among regional neighbors regarding Chinese 
intentions due to the nation’s perceived lack of transparency.  The offensive power 
projection capabilities China is building could be used in potential flashpoints such as the 
Spratly or Senkaku Islands or to threaten Pacific sea lanes.  Finally, the dearth of Sino-
American military-to-military contacts helps perpetuate the opacity of the military 
relationship, while each nation’s courtship of regional military alliances provides concern 
for the other. 
B. THE EXPANSION OF THE CHINESE MILITARY 
1. Implications of Military Modernization on Foreign Policy & Security 
Goals 
Whether or not China intends to conform to international norms or set up its own 
rules may be reflected in what it hopes to achieve with its military modernization.  As 
military capability provides the means to meet foreign and security policy ends, 
reconciling stated policy goals with upgraded capabilities may help answer what China 
hopes to achieve.  Chapter Two of the 2004 PRC White Paper on National Defense 
provides a good starting point for a current analysis of Chinese defense goals.  In this 
chapter, China publicly states that its national defense policy is strictly defensive in 
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nature and designed to foster its peaceful development.  Specifically, China outlines three 
main goals in achieving this declared peaceful policy:  preservation of national 
sovereignty, safeguarding national economic development and internal stability, and 
modernizing its defense forces.222  Preservation of national sovereignty involves not only 
the protection of China’s borders and maritime rights from foreign aggression, but also 
involves its ability to affect national unification, specifically regarding Taiwan.223  As a 
tool of the communist party, the PLA is employed to maintain party primacy and ensure 
domestic tranquility, thus furthering the CCP goal of economic development.224  
Modernization of Chinese military forces is viewed as necessary in furthering the other 
two goals and ensuring China is a credible player in an anticipated multi-polar world.225  
Aside from the currently unresolved Taiwan issue, these three goals do not appear to 
present overtly menacing Chinese intent.  However, one must reconcile these stated 
policy ends with the capability means. 
Since 1985, China has undergone a transformation of its defense strategy, 
stimulated by the overwhelming success enjoyed by the United States during Desert 
Storm.  This redefined strategy has radically altered Chinese attitudes about what military 
means are necessary to achieve their political ends.  Known as “limited war under high 
technology conditions,” this strategy came about within the context of post-Cold War 
American global preeminence and an often ambiguous Sino-American relationship.226  
As its name implies, China views potential future conflicts to be largely confined to 
regional skirmishes and expects the threat of a world war to be negligible in the 
foreseeable future.227  A logical inference from this strategy is that China would not 
desire major conflict with a military power such as the United States.  However, this 
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strategy does appear to acknowledge the United States as a potential obstacle to the 
Chinese goal of Taiwan reunification and sets a 600-mile force projection requirement on 
Chinese forces.228  The saliency of this fact in a post-reunification situation is the 
ingrained view of the United States as a Chinese opponent.  A hallmark of this new 
strategy is an acknowledgement of the previously downplayed role of weapons and 
technology in war fighting to create synergistic effects.229  This focus on technology, 
combined with an application of other lessons learned from the West, is known as the 
“Revolution in military affairs” (RMA) with Chinese characteristics. 
One of the key features of China’s RMA is a realization that manpower must be 
reallocated and better trained.  Twice downsized previously, the Chinese military is again 
being trimmed by 200,000 by the end of 2005.230  This downsizing coincides with an 
ongoing streamlining of the military hierarchy and elimination of technologically inferior 
Army (PLA) forces.  At the same time, China is placing greater emphasis on improving 
both the education and training of its personnel while optimizing manpower in high-tech 
units within the Navy (PLAN), Air Force (PLAAF), and Second Artillery Forces 
(China’s strategic missile force).231  Additionally, China is increasingly focused on joint 
service exercises designed to build synergy between China’s armed forces.232  The 
overall intent of these manpower measures is to facilitate a leaner and better prepared 
military force capable of carrying out China’s military strategy. 
China has begun to recognize the force multiplication value of information and 
the offensive value of information warfare (IW).  Again, China utilized lessons learned 
from recent U.S. conflicts to serve as a roadmap for its informational modernization.  
China has utilized commercial information technologies to advance its military 
command, control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR) modernization and is trying to create a command information 
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network capable of rapidly connecting war planners and war fighters.233  China is placing 
more emphasis on space-based imagery and reconnaissance satellites to bolster sparse 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.234  While timely 
information transmission is a force multiplier, IW is an asymmetry China feels it could 
exploit against a militarily superior adversary, such as the United States.  The military is 
developing IW capabilities specifically to target and disable an opponent’s command, 
control and operational capabilities.235  Although current IW systems are old and not 
widely deployed, China will likely attempt to utilize foreign technology transfers to 
improve the quality and quantity of IW systems.  China appears to be leveraging its 
growing economic integration with the West to further its goal of modernized IW 
systems.236  
The PLA has long suffered from outdated equipment, poor mobility, and lack of 
experience in joint warfare.237  Despite being last in priority for resources, Chinese 
ground forces are nonetheless benefiting from the current defense strategy.  Currently, 
China is focused on creation of rapid response units capable of quick deployment 
anywhere in China within 24 hours notice.238  Since Chinese ground forces continue to 
be based in defensive positions,239 this rapid deployment capability will enhance 
defensive readiness and allow China to rapidly move forces if attacked.  China envisions 
these new forces as “pockets of excellence” it hopes will develop new war fighting and 
deployment methods that can be transferred to the rest of the PLA.  The PLA logistical 
support continues to be an Achilles heel hindering effective joint operations.  In 1999, the 
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PLA instituted a 10 year logistic reform plan that will combine logistic support for the 
PLA, PLAN, and PLAAF.240  The hope is that centralized logistic support will aid joint 
war fighting. 
Along with the PLAAF, the PLAN is receiving increased emphasis under the 
current Chinese defense strategy.  China’s interest in advancing the PLAN from a coastal 
defense force to one that can project power out to 200-plus miles stems not only from its 
interest in Taiwan, but also the high economic importance placed on shipping lanes off 
China’s coast.  The PLAN currently consists mostly of aging Soviet equipment.  
Recently, China has retrofitted some older destroyers and frigates with modern French 
designed weapon suites to improve fire control and anti-submarine (ASW) 
capabilities.241  Although China has acquired three aircraft carriers, the PLAN does not 
appear to be capable of employing it due to a multitude of Chinese limitations.  The 
Chinese appear to be placing strong emphasis on creating a modern submarine force.  
The addition of four Russian Kilo class submarines in the mid-1990s signaled the 
beginning of a submarine force modernization that will augment the existing five Han 
class nuclear powered attack submarines.242  This focus on submarine warfare appears to 
be consistent with a strategy of maritime superiority within 200 miles of shore and would 
likely help China deny maritime access to this area and facilitate force projection in the 
event of a potential conflict.                      
The PLAAF currently consists mostly of aging Soviet fighter aircraft used for air 
defense.  Though still a formidable force due to its size (3,000 combat aircraft), the 
PLAAF currently lacks range and offensive capability.  The PLAAF modernization has 
begun to reduce the number of outdated fighter aircraft and seeks to introduce or increase 
the number of air superiority, attack, early warning, air refueling, and transport aircraft in 
the inventory.243  Additionally, China is particularly interested in obtaining precision 
weaponry as it recognizes the advantages these provided the United States in recent 
conflicts.  Although some indigenous aircraft research and development (R&D) is  
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transpiring, the track record of Chinese combat aircraft production is not good.  The 
Chinese continue to rely on Russian export of advanced military aircraft and will likely 
continue to do so in the future.  The addition of air refueling capability and an increased 
interest in attack aircraft suggest the PLAAF is transitioning from a strictly defensive 
force to one with an offensive force projection capability.     
The Second Artillery is primarily responsible for deterring an enemy nuclear 
attack on China.  China is applying its RMA to this force in the form of increased missile 
R&D, enhancement of information flows, and improved accuracy through satellite-aided 
guidance systems.244  China’s principal nuclear missile upgrade involves the 
development and deployment of the DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with 
the anticipation of tripling its ICBM force by 2010.  Future plans call for an upgraded, 
solid propellant DF-31 and a submarine launched version.245  These upgrades facilitate 
quicker response and could enhance second strike capability.  China is utilizing a portion 
of its missile R&D to build a short range ballistic missile (SRBM) force and research 
land-attack cruise missiles.  The Second Artillery is expected to integrate these weapons 
into multi-service operations in the future.246  These developments suggest an offensive 
intent and provide China with a credible ability to threaten regional neighbors.  While 
China pursues these ostensibly offensive conventional missiles, its nuclear missiles 
appear to be mostly defensive in nature.  China is estimated to possess approximately 20 
ICBMs and 70 intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), currently has no first strike 
capability (and has publicly renounced such a strategy), and remains vulnerable to a 
preemptive strike.247  However, one could argue the anticipated advances negate the 
threat of American nuclear forces in a regional, while enhancing the conventional 
offensive capacity of the PRC.  Additionally, China has gradually moved away from a 
counter-value strategy toward a limited nuclear war fighting strategy.248  This could 
portend a shift in Chinese intentions as new missile and warhead technology comes on 
line.              
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Chinese military modernization may not bring it to parity with potential Western 
adversaries such as the United States, but there are indications that China is researching 
trump card weapons known as shashoujian, or “assassin’s mace.”  The term assassin’s 
mace has appeared more frequently in Chinese professional journals since 1999, 
suggesting there is not only interest, but potential R&D on such a weapon.249  Though it 
is unclear in what arena such a weapon (or weapons) may be used, it is generally 
accepted these weapons are designed to prey on an adversary’s asymmetries.  Chinese 
interest in IW could be their “assassin’s mace.” 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Chinese military modernization is the 
lack of budgetary transparency.  Understanding the ways and means employed by the 
PLA to fund its activities is considered vital in analyzing other aspects of China’s 
military and provides a measure of its national priorities.250  While the PRC publishes its 
annual official defense expenditures, it is widely believed these figures represent a 
fraction of the actual amount spent on China’s defense.  The Department of Defense 
estimates China underreports its defense expenditures by one-half to two-thirds the actual 
amount.251  China often omits reporting costs associated with foreign weapons 
procurement, nuclear weapons development, defense based R&D, and subsidies provided 
to defense industries.252  Juxtaposing China’s self reported 12.6 percent increase in 2005 
defense spending against steady to declining defense budgets for neighboring 
countries,253 raises questions about Chinese objectives and makes proclamations of 
peaceful intent sound specious.  Indeed, China’s lack of transparency regarding its 
military build up has caused Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to qualify China’s 
inclusion as a partner in the international system on “both cooperation and candor” 
regarding its military intentions.254
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While the preceding paragraphs highlight the direction the Chinese armed forces 
are ostensibly headed, the reality is the PLA and all its derivatives remain a very 
antiquated fighting force with severe limitations.  For example, while China has taken 
steps to modernize its submarine force, its own ASW capabilities have limited detection 
range and are assessed to be poor.255  While China has shown a desire to emulate the 
United States’ experience in the first Gulf War, the PLA remains an infantry force 
lacking in combined arms capability nearly fifteen years later.  Most weapon programs 
are behind schedule due to systemic constraints; many programs are simply proposed – 
not yet in full R&D.  The upshot of these limitations is a watering down of the military 
means designed to achieve the policy ends.  Before addressing the constraints hindering 
China’s defense development, it is important to settle the earlier question of reconciling 
policy ends with their modernization efforts. 
China is clearly interested in obtaining improved offensive capability, which 
makes its assertions that its force is strictly defensive somewhat suspect.  Development of 
new conventional missile technology, an increased emphasis on integrating IW with 
military operations, and desire for in-flight refueling capability signal something beyond 
defense of the homeland.  The obvious answer is that China is seeking to improve its 
power projection capabilities to force settlement of the Taiwan issue.  However, China 
has also publicly stated its desire to be perceived as a credible force in a multi-polar 
world.256  This would appear to presume the decline of U.S. power and the corresponding 
rise of other poles of power.  This could be interpreted as either a Chinese desire to be 
one of those poles of power, or to challenge the rise of one of these poles in its region.  
Given the mileage goal set for Chinese power projection (600 miles), this would appear 
to be a logical conclusion.  However, the current state of the Chinese military does not 
support this agenda.  Additionally, endemic constraints suggest a difficult road to achieve 
this offensive credibility. 
2. Constraints to Chinese Military Modernization 
Modernizing China’s military force is a daunting task with a plethora of obstacles 
to success.  The primary obstacle facing defense modernization is the availability of 
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funding.  Many have cited the drastic increase in Chinese defense spending as indicative 
of China’s nefarious motives.  However, this clamor over China’s drastically enlarged 
defense budget may be somewhat overblown.  In inflation adjusted terms, official defense 
budgets have stayed constant or slightly declined through the 1990s.257  If one instead 
utilizes widely accepted estimates of China’s defense budget, it still pales in comparison 
with that of some of its potential adversaries.  Additionally, given China’s economic 
emergence since Dengist reforms, its percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) spent 
on the military has declined from 5.8 percent in 1984 to 2.4 percent in 1994.258  While 
Chinese defense spending is likely many times that which is officially reported, the fact 
remains that defense competes with other national priorities for limited government 
resources.  China’s placement of the military at the end of its four modernizations 
illustrates this point.  Beyond the question of how much funding the military receives lies 
the question of where the funding is spent.  Personnel expenditures still make up a large 
portion of China’s defense budget.  Even with cuts in personnel, China will be forced to 
increase soldier pay and benefits to remain competitive with the civilian sector.  If China 
spends an estimated 50 percent of its available budget on personnel, there is very little 
left for defense modernization programs.259  Furthermore, international arms sales – 
previously a significant source of additional funding for the PLA – have dried up due to 
the obsolescence of Chinese weaponry.260  Simply put, despite increases in military 
spending, China is still hard pressed to make real headway in its defense modernization 
efforts.      
Chinese aversion to military alliances presents a two-fold problem regarding its 
military modernization efforts.  On one hand, its “go it alone” strategy requires it to be 
solely responsible for its defense, arguably requiring greater funding to maintain requisite 
defensive forces.261  This saps resources that could otherwise be applied to modernization 
efforts.  On the other hand, China’s reluctance to team with other nations also reduces its 
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opportunities to participate in joint military exercises.262  This prevents China from 
gaining insight into new war fighting techniques and effectively forces the Chinese to 
develop tactics in relative isolation.  Furthermore, this self imposed isolation increases 
suspicions regarding China, complicating Chinese diplomatic efforts.    
Another major problem facing defense modernization is the low overall 
technological level of China’s defense industry.  China is essentially trying to create a 
21st century military with a defense industrial complex that is decades behind.  China has 
had an exceedingly difficult time producing indigenous weapon systems and components 
as a result of this deficiency.  This leads to dependence on foreign suppliers for 
components China requires for those systems produced domestically.  Poor systems 
integration often leads Chinese defense contractors to painfully incorporate foreign 
assistance in local designs.  The overdue Chinese J-10 fighter program provides a classic 
case in point:  Chinese airframe, Israeli avionics, Russian engine – 18 years from 
conception to low rate production.263  Chinese attempts at reverse engineering have been 
suspect at best as evidenced by their extreme difficulty in copying an F-16 obtained from 
Pakistan.264  Often, China simply has no choice but to purchase entire weapon systems 
from foreign nations.  The reliance on foreign nations for so much defense support 
subjects China’s defense to the variable nature of international politics.  This point 
became painfully clear to China as American and European sanctions following the 1989 
Tiananmen massacre hindered several weapons programs reliant on foreign technology. 
The failure of China’s defense industry may be directly attributable to the legacy 
of the Cultural Revolution.  Already reeling from the Soviet boycott, the Chinese military 
industrial complex further atrophied when Mao and his followers targeted those 
suspected of revisionist thought as enemies of the state.  Many scientists, engineers, and 
teachers were either jailed or executed due to fears of sedition.  Additionally, the closing 
of schools and deployment of technical students to the countryside for “reeducation” 
created a “hole” in the scientific continuity of Chinese society.  This hole caused China to 
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fall behind the rest of the world technologically and has yet to be overcome.265  Some 
Chinese assert that China does not need to “catch up” with a technologically superior foe 
such as the United States.  Instead, some assert that a few “pockets of excellence” within 
the defense industry are enough to thwart U.S. power projection in the Asia-Pacific 
region.266  This attitude threatens China with future failure as a discounted area of 
technology today could become a requisite for a “pocket of excellence” tomorrow.  
Furthermore, this focus on “pockets of excellence” ignores the likelihood that a 
technologically superior adversary would be able to get ahead of China in this area of 
expertise. 
3. Impact on Sino-American Relations 
Conflict with the United States appears remote in the near term and removal of 
the Taiwan issue would seem to virtually eliminate the likelihood of a Sino-American 
military showdown.  However, there are indications China believes the United States is 
its principal military adversary in the Asia-Pacific region.  Development and procurement 
of weapon systems designed specifically for offensive purposes or to counter U.S. 
strengths suggest China’s stated defense policy does not represent the nation’s intent.  
Chinese military analysts freely acknowledge China’s concern regarding the United 
States, attributing the antipathy to a perception of the United States as a hegemonic, 
expansionist power.267  This perceived hegemony extends beyond military 
considerations, including domination of international financial systems, pursuit of an 
interventionist policy regarding human rights, and waging an ideological crusade to 
further democracy.268  China thus feels it must attempt to militarily check the United 
States to foster a multi-polar environment,269 suggesting either Chinese realism or a 
Hobbesian construction regarding the United States. 
While China certainly faces significant constraints to its modernization program, 
a China that views itself as the dominant regional power could present concerns for 
 
265 Howard, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army:  ‘Short Arms and Slow Legs’,” Internet. 
266 Mark Stokes, “China’s Strategic Modernization:  Implications for the United States” (student 
dissertation., U.S. Army War College, September 1999), 136. 
267 Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, 297.  
268 Ibid., 298. 
269 Ibid., 298. 
67 
                                                
China’s neighbors and a United States committed to the defense of its regional allies.  
Despite stated American support of a one China policy, the PRC has exhibited a 
predisposition towards military threat in an attempt to coerce a desired resolution to the 
Taiwan issue.  Similarly, a post-reunification China might employ military threats to 
achieve regional goals.  A China emboldened by the successful modernization of its 
military could view a liberal institutional approach towards disagreements as too 
confining and opt for a realpolitik solution. 
As stated in the 2004 PRC White Paper on National Defense, China desires to be 
a credible player in a multi-polar world.270  Ironically, an offensive minded Chinese 
military could have the effect of perpetuating a uni-polar situation.  China’s previous 
unwillingness to enter into military alliances coupled with past military actions against 
neighbors (Korea, India, Vietnam) have instilled suspicions within China’s 
neighborhood.  A modernized Chinese military could present a security dilemma for 
China’s neighbors and force them to seek refuge under the aegis of American military 
protection.  This could serve to perpetuate a PRC animus towards the United States and 
stymie closer relations in a post-reunification era. 
C. POTENTIAL FLASHPOINTS 
While Taiwan presents the most visible Chinese territorial claim, other potential 
flashpoints exist.  Both the Senkaku and Spratly Islands represent Chinese attempts to 
enforce historical territorial rights.  Furthermore, the discovery of oil in the vicinity of 
each set of islands suggests the military lengths China may pursue for territory deemed 
strategically valuable. 
Located at varying distances up to several hundred miles off the southeast coast of 
China, the Spratly Islands are specks of land upon which China bases its claims to the 
broader South China Sea region.  The suspected wealth of fossil fuel reserves within this 
area has made it an increasingly important strategic factor for the Chinese, even as they 
pursue improved diplomatic relations with its neighbors.  Chinese territoriality stems 
from navigational routes established through the area by Chinese seafarers during the 
 
270 Chinese National Government, China’s National Defense in 2004, 3. 
68 
                                                
Han dynasty, over 2,000 years ago.271  Following Japan’s cession of all territorial gains 
after World War II, China reasserted its historical claims to the Spratlys and the South 
China Sea.  China took a bellicose stance towards neighboring nations making similar 
claims to the region, seizing the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974.  China has 
somewhat moderated its stance towards its Southeast Asian competitors in the South 
China Sea, but still maintains its singular claim to the region.  Through the 1990s, China 
boldly moved to solidify its territorial claims by establishing a permanent presence on 
certain islands and bolstering its military presence in the region, ostensibly to intimidate 
its rivals.272  Furthermore, the Chinese law on territorial waters and their contiguous 
areas provided PRC legal precedence and self-validated its territorial actions.273  Aside 
from infrequent skirmishes between China and the Philippines, ASEAN countries have 
sought a diplomatic solution to their territorial disputes with China.  However, China has 
successfully avoided territorial concessions, essentially maintaining the status quo, and 
prevented underlying concerns regarding its regional military build up from fomenting 
unified ASEAN opposition.274  China may have also attempted to utilize these diplomatic 
maneuvers with ASEAN in an effort to weaken American power in the region.  China 
had pushed for prohibition on foreign naval exercises in the 2002 Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,275 a measure that could be viewed as limiting 
not only ASEAN signatories, but also the United States, superpower benefactor of several 
regional nations.  Juxtaposing China’s South China Sea claims against its current claims 
to Taiwan presents an interesting, and potentially telling aspect of Chinese foreign policy.  
Similar to China’s approach to Taiwan, the nation appears to be utilizing a carrot-stick 
approach to achieve its goals in the South China Sea: 
Beijing may also be seeking a tactical and negotiating advantage ahead of 
agreeing to negotiations.  China typically takes a hard/soft pattern in 
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territorial disputes and appears to be using a similar strategy in the 
Spratlys.276 
This suggests China views military force, or the threat thereof, as a viable instrument 
towards achieving policy goals.  A possible peaceful reacquisition of Taiwan may not 
dissuade China from pursuing a similar strategy later, and could validate China’s use of 
such an approach towards other issues. 
While China has recently approached the Spratly issue with greater diplomatic 
aplomb, it has not responded similarly towards the Sino-Japanese dispute over the 
Senkaku / Diaoyutai Islands.  Like the Spratlys, these potentially oil rich volcanic 
islands between Okinawa and Taiwan are claimed by China based on historical Chinese 
navigation routes and fishing grounds.277  Japan claimed the islands in 1895, separate 
from other islands ceded by China under the Treaty of Shimonseki, and thus not subject 
to reversion to China following World War II.278  After Japan received the islands from 
American protection in 1971, China began to encroach upon the territory and reasserted 
its historical claims.  Chinese intrusions into the area Japan claims as an economic 
exclusion zone (EEZ) have included not only benign ventures such as oil exploration 
vehicles and ocean research vessels, but also more threatening military warships and 
aircraft.279  The frequent assertiveness of Chinese forces and apparent flouting of 
international rules make these intrusions particularly troubling.  Since 2004, a Chinese 
Navy destroyer took aim at a Japanese Maritime Defense Forces aircraft near the 
disputed area, Chinese spy planes entered Japan’s EEZ three times, and a Chinese Han-
class submarine was observed patrolling off the coastal waters of Okinawa.280  China 
appears to be pursuing these actions, despite their possible violation of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).281  Under UNCLOS, both sides 
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should refrain from actions which could undermine a negotiated settlement.  China’s 
pursuit of drilling near the median line of the two nations’ EEZs violates the spirit of 
UNCLOS, while Chinese military harassment could be viewed as an attempt to 
intimidate Japan and establish a sphere of influence in the region.282  Japan shares a 
measure of culpability in perpetuating this disagreement.  Both Japan and China have 
offered solutions to the situation that the other has rejected, while nationalism on both 
sides discourages cooperation.283  Additionally, Japan allegedly used military force of its 
own in January 2004 to drive off Chinese fishermen within Japan’s EEZ.284  Nonetheless, 
Chinese actions regarding the Senkaku / Diaoyutai Islands reflect a trend towards neo-
realist tendencies.  China uses a show of force to intimidate a rival, suggesting a 
predilection towards realpolitik.  Conversely, China’s willingness to abrogate the spirit of 
UNCLOS could show contempt for a multilateral institutional solution that may not 
provide China with terms it desires. 
Both the Spratly and Senkaku flashpoints offer an opportunity to view Chinese 
military actions apart from the Taiwan issue.  China appears to utilize a similar pattern of 
military intimidation towards nations opposing its national interests.  Furthermore, China 
seems to place considerable emphasis on the value of historical claims.  These would 
appear to validate apprehensions a militarily powerful China could bully weaker 
neighbors and presents concerns for a United States committed to cooperative action with 
other global powers.285
D. MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS:  FOSTERING CONCERN 
The Sino-American dyad is further complicated by two additional military 
factors.  The opacity of the Sino-American military relationship exacerbates underlying 
tensions between the two nations by helping to maintain an air of distrust.  Similarly, 
American pursuit of regional alliances perpetuates a sense of encirclement among the 
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Chinese, while Beijing’s pursuit of strengthened ties with Russia could raise the hackles 
of American leaders. 
There are several benefits to improved Sino-American military-military relations.  
First, reciprocal military exchanges foster clarity of each side’s strategic viewpoint, while 
reducing misperceptions.286  Second, direct exposure to each nation’s military 
capabilities could dissuade the two nations from considering a military option that would 
necessitate an in-kind response from the other.287  Third, a Sino-American military 
exchange relationship could become a springboard for similar Chinese military 
engagement with regional nations aligned with the United States,288 mitigating regional 
military concerns.  The net result of an improved Sino-American military relationship 
could be a radical alteration of the way each nation approaches the other by facilitating 
constructive dialogue.  Thus, one could conclude that a robust Sino-American military-
military relationship would positively affect the social construction each nation ascribes 
to the other, particularly in a post-reunification environment. 
Unfortunately, Sino-American military ties are hampered by a variety of factors.  
A primary American concern involves the lack of reciprocity by the Chinese vis-à-vis 
military exchanges.289  Additionally, the Chinese build up of offensive weaponry 
concerns American leaders that the Chinese could leverage such exchanges to further 
enhance their offensive capabilities.290  The status of broader Sino-American relations 
affects the level and tenor of military-military relations.291  Finally, closer Sino-American 
military ties could negatively affect perceptions around Asia, notably among American 
allies.292
Despite limitations, recent efforts suggest a desire to improve the military 
relationship between the United States and China.  The October 2005 visit to China by 
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Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld underscored American interest in bolstering 
military relations, while statements by Chinese leaders welcomed military exchanges as a 
way of growing the larger Sino-American relationship.293  The visit, including an 
unprecedented stop at China’s strategic missile headquarters, represented a watershed 
opportunity, but also underscored lingering concerns.  During his visit, Rumsfeld 
challenged the veracity of Chinese defense budgetary figures, a claim that was quickly 
rebuffed by General Cao Gangchuan, who retorted “that is, indeed, the true budget we 
have today.”294  Similarly, General Cao objected to Congressional restrictions placed on 
Sino-American military exchanges due to fears China could gain a war fighting 
advantage.295  While improved Sino-American military-military relations could pave the 
way to better understanding between the two nations, it is clear that each side harbors 
considerable distrust that will have to be breached before military-military relations can 
truly work. 
Military alliances with other regional nations present another potential obstacle 
towards improved Sino-American relations.  The American National Security Strategy 
encourages strengthening bilateral alliances and employing military assets to prevent 
attacks on both the United States and its allies.296  However, American perpetuation of 
historic alliances, combined with new basing arrangements and military deployments 
provides a measure of concern to the Chinese.297  The close military relationship with 
Japan in the post-Cold War era has helped provide the United States with regional access 
and military influence, despite the lack of a superpower adversary.  Similarly, the ROK-
U.S. alliance guarantees American military influence near Chinese territory, though this 
alliance has appeared less durable recently.  Following the terrorist attacks in September 
2001, the United States expanded military relationships with India, Central Asian nations, 
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and several ASEAN countries, ostensibly to combat terrorism.298  One could argue that a 
constructivist China might feel less constrained and thus less suspicious of U.S. 
intentions in a post-reunification era.  However, a realist China would possibly still feel 
threatened by the continued presence of U.S. military assets around its periphery, 
regardless of the resolution of the Taiwan issue.  Recent Chinese actions suggest it is 
more likely to choose the later option over the former. 
China has taken measures to shore up its military position and oppose American 
actions around its periphery.  Since 1996, China and Russia have increasingly found 
common ground in their belief in a multi-polar world.299  This warming relationship has 
blossomed into a military relationship harkening back to the days of the Stalin-Mao 
alliance.  Since the international arms embargo following the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
massacre, Russia has emerged as China’s principal supplier of advanced weaponry.300  
However, the August 2005 Peace Mission joint military exercise near Vladivostok 
recently emphasized the depth and direction of the entente.  During the exercise, Russia 
demonstrated advanced supersonic cruise missiles designed to neutralize aircraft carriers 
and participated in offensive, combined forces maneuvers.301  People’s University of 
China professor Jin Canrong underscored the mutual sentiment of the exercise 
participants by saying:  “(t)he main target is the United States.  Both sides want to 
improve their bargaining position in terms of security, politics, and economics.”302  
China has also enlisted Russian assistance in its efforts to push back American influence 
on its periphery.  During the July 2005 Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, 
China and Russia jointly requested an American timetable for withdrawal of its forces 
from Central Asia.303  At the end of July, Uzbek President Islam Karimov demanded 
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Washington withdraw U.S. forces from Karshi-Khanabad airbase,304 perhaps suggesting 
a measure of influence by the Moscow-Beijing axis. 
The combined effect of limited Sino-American military-military contacts and 
bilateral military relationships with other regional nations appears to perpetuate mutual 
suspicions.  At the very least, each nation displays an ambivalence that fosters a negative 
social construction towards the other.  At the worst, the two nations exhibit neo-realist 
tendencies that suggest an ingrained distrust and difficulty achieving a measure of 
cooperation.  The amelioration of the Taiwan issue may not overcome the latter example.  
E. SUMMARY 
China and the United States face a multitude of questions regarding their military 
relationship.  Though threatening in appearance, Chinese military modernization faces 
several challenges that make its policy ends more difficult to achieve.  Although China 
has the potential to menace its immediate neighbors, it does not appear to have the 
capability, nor is it likely to obtain the ability in the near future to project power capable 
of directly threatening the United States.  However, China’s pattern of behavior suggests 
it is primarily interested in utilizing its military prowess to augment diplomacy in a 
carrot-stick analogy vis-à-vis its regional neighbors.  Despite China’s apparent perception 
of the United States as its principal adversary, it is debatable whether China would 
directly challenge American military power.  Rather, it appears China is attempting to 
balance American power with a Russian alliance. 
Chinese actions would appear to suggest a predilection towards realism or a 
Hobbesian social construction.  While the peaceful assimilation of Taiwan would 
arguably eliminate the main military obstacle between the United States and China, the 
latter’s offshore actions in the South and East China Seas parallel its Taiwan strategy and 
suggest future areas of friction for China and a regionally engaged United States.  As 
Admiral Blair posited, does China intend to play by established rules, or does it intend to 
set up its own?  The answer may be a qualified “both” – China may want to pursue a neo-
realist approach and establish its own rules, but due to its current military limitations it 
may have no choice but to play by the established rules for the time being. 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
A. THE REALIST DILEMMA 
Resolution of the Taiwan issue would undoubtedly quell fears throughout the 
Asia-Pacific region of a military confrontation between the United States and China.  
Indeed, the peaceful merger of Taiwan with the PRC would appear to remove a 
significant impediment to better Sino-American relations.  While the United States and 
China have vastly improved their bilateral affairs since the creation of the PRC, a degree 
of suspicion, competition, and antagonism remains.  This thesis has shown that 
significant areas of contention exist between the United States and China, beyond the 
question of Taiwan. 
Both nations appear to approach the Sino-American relationship with neo-realist 
proclivities.  Although China has entered the international economic and political 
mainstream, it continues to view the United States as its principal threat and maneuvers 
to counter American influence.  Conversely, the United States ostensibly welcomes 
Chinese ascendance, yet appears to utilize its power to constrain aspects of China’s rise.  
This pattern would seem to indicate mutual adherence to a neo-realist strategy.  This 
possibility is further reinforced when considering each nation’s participation in 
multinational regimes.  China is increasingly engaged in regional forums and is 
beginning to take a more active role at the United Nations.  Nonetheless, this latent 
distrust persists.  This condition appears to transcend the issues surrounding the ROC-
PRC reunification issue, suggesting limited impact on the long term relationship between 
the two nations following a peaceful Taiwan Strait resolution.  One could conclude that 
the Sino-American relationship in a post-reunification environment is likely to continue a 
neo-realist pattern. 
The United States faces a potential dilemma in this post-reunification 
environment.  It is probable that the United States will continue to be pressured by an 
ascendant China and could face erosion of its power in the Asia-Pacific.  However, 
despite the realist principles that appear to underpin its relationship with the PRC, the 
United States government may face domestic and international expectations to further 
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moderate its position towards China after removal of the Taiwan impediment.  
Furthermore, the United States has advertised the benefits of China’s inclusion in the 
world community.305  If the United States took an abrupt hard line with the PRC, it could 
risk political isolation as its aggressive position would be out of step with its previous 
emphasis on Chinese participation in the global community.  Thus, policy makers would 
need to tread carefully between confrontation and conciliation with the PRC in a post-
reunification environment.           
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Employ an Integrative Foreign Policy 
The United States is arguably moving away from the Cold War containment 
paradigm towards an integrative foreign policy doctrine.306  Such a doctrinal shift 
involves building effective international arrangements for greater collectivity in action,307 
and appears to accept the rise of other poles of power.  Pursuing such an integrative 
policy vis-à-vis China could provide the United States with a middle ground solution to a 
post-reunification dilemma. 
The United States should maintain existing East Asian regional military alliances 
and work towards fostering new arrangements.  In doing so, the United States will 
provide a clear message that it will remain intimately engaged in the Asia-Pacific region.  
Consistent with greater emphasis on military alliances, the United States should maintain 
a robust military presence in the region.  In much the same way that U.S. forces have 
facilitated peace and prosperity in a post-Cold War Europe, they could similarly provide 
a stabilizing presence in a post-reunification Asia-Pacific.  However, the United States 
should direct such efforts in a way that ultimately fosters collective regional security.  
America could take the lead in helping Asian nations address an array of security issues 
ranging from terrorism to piracy, while facilitating confidence building measures 
between rival neighbors.  China could be included in such an arrangement, perhaps 
assuaging fears of encirclement and fostering greater responsibility regarding territorial 
claims. 
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One facet of the United States security strategy involves furthering global 
economic growth through free trade.308  It would be a mistake to resort to protectionism 
in U.S. trade disagreements with China as it would run counter to the message 
Washington is attempting to broadcast to the global community.  Rather, the United 
States should press forward confidently with its free trade agenda, particularly in regions 
China appears to be particularly interested.  The United States is moving ahead on a 
variety of bilateral free trade agreements and engineering regional initiatives to create 
free trade zones.309  In the process, the United States is championing the connection 
between trade and social development.310  Through these actions, the United States 
arguably improves its global economic and political stature.  The United States should 
capitalize on its position by aggressively exposing and criticizing unfair trade practices 
through regimes such as the WTO.  Furthermore, the United States should encourage 
greater sanctioning by the WTO to dissuade trade chicanery and require greater 
accountability by individual nations.  American trade initiatives should stimulate demand 
for foreign direct investment in those areas so targeted.  The United States should stand 
ready to capitalize on this demand. 
The United States will continue to push for greater respect of human rights and 
champion democratic reform.311  However, it is impractical to set this as a doctrine since 
it occasionally conflicts with other foreign policy goals.312  Therefore, the United States 
should increasingly employ multilateral pressure through the United Nations to promote 
democratic ideals and respect for human rights.  Coupled with this increased emphasis on 
the United Nations’ role in fostering human dignity, the United States should 
simultaneously push for reform of the global body to prevent political or economic 
interests from clouding the organization’s mission.  On the issue of preservation of 
Taiwanese democracy after reunification, the United States should be prepared to respect 
the free choices of the Taiwanese people.313  However, it should also stand ready to 
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support the people of Taiwan through direct and multinational pressure on the mainland 
if those choices are infringed.  Although a nation such as China may still perceive the 
United States as responsible for such pressure, enforcement would be diffused over UN 
member nations, instilling a sense of global responsibility for compliance. 
Through an integrative foreign policy, the United States would appear to bring its 
actions in line with its espoused acknowledgement of the value of multilateral action.314  
This could help repair some of the damage to American international political prestige 
brought on by the perception of American unilateralism and bolster its stature among the 
community of nations.  Furthermore, it could provide a more efficient check towards a 
China increasingly enmeshed in the web of multinational regimes.  If the United States 
could transform issues from a Sino-American struggle to a multinational concern, it could 
present China with the option of acquiescence or isolation.  Conversely, the United States 
would need to be prepared for limits on its own capacity for maneuver if it chose to 
pursue this approach.  However, this could be the best course of action concerning a 
China increasingly finding its voice on the international stage.  If the United States allows 
China to seize the international political initiative, it could find itself marginalized in a 
post-reunification environment. 
2. Seek Common Ground 
America has acknowledged China’s rise to great power status.315  The United 
States should draw closer to China, particularly in a post-reunification environment, to 
address mutual concerns and facilitate greater understanding at various levels.  Such an 
approach could ameliorate some of the suspicion and distrust that appears to be endemic 
in the Sino-American relationship.  Furthermore, an America that extends a proverbial 
olive branch to China will possibly strengthen its international influence. 
The United States should address the growing energy competition between the 
two nations.  As China’s demand for oil, natural gas, and other forms of energy grows in 
the coming years, it portends an area of acute concern for the Sino-American 
relationship.  The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission has 
recommended establishment of a U.S.-China Energy Working Group to initiate high level 
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joint dialogue on this potentially contentious issue.316  Furthermore, the Commission 
acknowledges the value of cooperative efforts to address China’s underdeveloped energy 
capacity and concerns regarding its mercantilist approach to energy procurement.317  
Furthermore, the United States should utilize this opportunity to involve other nations 
such as Japan and India that similarly have concerns about the availability of energy to 
fuel their economies.  This would not only serve to enlist greater creative thought on the 
subject, but would also help strengthen an integrative American foreign policy.  
Addressing the energy question could diffuse an area of contention before it becomes 
critical and would help demonstrate American commitment towards collaboration versus 
combativeness. 
The United States should improve military-military contacts with the PRC.  The 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission has recommended discussions 
with China to develop and implement confidence building measures at various levels of 
civilian and military leadership to prevent escalation of situations into military crises.318  
Though laudable, this objective would require closer military-military ties to succeed.  
The United States should initiate improved military-military dialogue by addressing 
military concerns germane to both nations.  One possible area of common ground 
involves each nation’s mutual interest in containing terrorism, particularly in advance of 
the 2008 Beijing Olympics.  Chinese military opacity remains a source of concern 
regarding improved military-military relations.  The United States could attempt to tie 
greater Chinese transparency with a Chinese issue of concern to the Chinese in an attempt 
to resolve a potential impasse with issue linkage.  Despite concerns, there are definite 
benefits to fostering military-military contacts.  As Chinese President Hu Jintao recently 
stated, an improved Sino-American military association will pay dividends to the broader 
relationship between the two nations.319
Beyond improving military-military contacts, the United States should 
increasingly focus on improving the broader cultural relationship between the two 
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nations.  One area where the United States could begin would be through improved 
educational exchanges.  These cross culture exchanges could involve increased American 
student enrollment in Chinese universities, as well as institutional collaboration.  
Cooperation with American universities would likely be welcomed by a China interested 
in the creation of one hundred world class institutions of higher learning,320  while 
America may welcome the educational association as a vehicle to diffuse American 
attitudes and mores within Chinese society.  Other areas of potential cultural interaction 
could include sports and entertainment, performing arts, and literature. 
The overall goal of seeking common ground with the Chinese is an attempt to 
mitigate some of the historical distrust pervading the relationship.  While this approach 
may appear to offer promise, there are no guarantees each nation may not continue to 
cling to its realist view of the other.  Nonetheless, employing such a strategy could 
further an integrative foreign policy by showcasing the constructive nature of American 
relations towards China in a post-reunification era. 
C. OUTLOOK 
Resolution of the Taiwan question may not ameliorate contentious issues between 
the United States and China.  America should take a proactive approach to preserve its 
engaged position in a post-reunification Asia-Pacific.  However, this stance should 
support America’s stated broader goals of multilateralism and collective effort.  On one 
hand, a strictly confrontational approach to the PRC risks marginalizing American 
international political strength.  On the other hand, a strictly conciliatory approach 
validates less desirable aspects of Chinese behavior and invites additional challenges.  
Thus, the United States should approach a unified China with both strength and 
partnership in the post-reunification epoch.     
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